In 2024, Ukrainian diplomacy launched a strategic initiative aimed at strengthening ties with Latin America and the Caribbean. In January, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs introduced Ukraine’s first-ever five-year plan to develop relations with the region. By May, it rolled out a three-year Communication Strategy titled “Ukraine – Latin American and Caribbean States.”
Brazil, in particular, has emerged as a key focus. As Latin America’s political and economic powerhouse, Brazil’s influence extends across the region and beyond. Securing Brazilian political support could significantly elevate Ukraine’s voice in international and regional organisations where Brazil is a member, enhancing Ukraine’s presence on the global stage.
Ukraine is eager to expand its trade and economic ties with Brazil, focusing on increasing exports to the Brazilian market and attracting investment for the country’s post-war reconstruction. Brazilian construction firms, known for their expertise in rebuilding areas hit by natural disasters and conflict, are seen as key partners in this effort.
Equally promising is the potential for deeper collaboration in science and technology, particularly in the fields of aerospace, telecommunications, and information technology. Reviving the Alcântara Cyclone Space project—unilaterally cancelled by Brazil in 2015—or launching a similar initiative would benefit both nations. Yet, despite the clear opportunities, strengthening cooperation with Brazil remains one of the most complex challenges in Ukraine’s broader Latin American strategy.
Lula’s ‘balancing’ act and global ambitions
Despite ongoing bilateral dialogue between Ukraine and Brazil, Brazil’s position on Russian aggression against Ukraine remains notably ‘balanced’. On one hand, Brazil has condemned Russia’s unlawful invasion and refuses to recognize any territorial changes stemming from the war. It has consistently called for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Yet, on the other hand, Brazil has opposed isolating Russia and is critical of sanctions, viewing them as a punitive tool in international relations. In early 2023, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva proposed a mediation initiative to begin negotiations aimed at resolving what he termed the “armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia.” Lula suggested that countries such as China, Mexico, Indonesia, and the UAE could be involved in this proposed peace process.
At the 11th Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 2022, Brazil supported four of six resolutions concerning Russia’s aggression against Ukraine but notably abstained from votes on expelling Russia from the UN Human Rights Council and on reparations to Ukraine. Brazil also participated in all four meetings of national security and foreign policy advisers on the principles of peace for Ukraine and global stability, convened by Ukraine in Denmark (June 2023), Saudi Arabia (August 2023), Malta (October 2023), and Switzerland (January 2024). However, at the Peace Summit in Switzerland on June 15-16, Brazil was the only country present in an observer capacity, represented by its ambassador to Switzerland, Claudia Fonseca Buti. Following the summit, Brazil declined to endorse the joint communiqué. Instead, Brazil, in coordination with China, unveiled a joint peace plan during Special Adviser Celso Amorim’s visit to Beijing on May 23. This six-point document is essentially a reworking of China’s peace proposal, first introduced in February 2023. The timing of this plan, released just a month before the Peace Summit in Switzerland, suggests an effort by China and Brazil to present an alternative framework for resolving what they defined as an “armed conflict” from the perspective of two leading nations within the Global South.
Brazil’s ‘balanced’ stance on Russian aggression against Ukraine reflects the broader foreign policy approach of President Lula da Silva.
On one hand, Lula’s administration prioritises maintaining robust relations with the United States and the European Union, both key investors in Brazil’s economic restructuring efforts. On the other hand, it remains committed to preserving close ties with China, Brazil’s largest export market and a critical source of investment and credit. This dual strategy underscores Brazil’s attempt to navigate between its Western allies and its economic dependence on China.
Lula’s administration, however, envisions Brazil’s rising global influence through the lens of “South-South” cooperation and deeper integration within BRICS. This approach echoes the foreign policy direction Lula set during his previous presidential terms (2003-2010) when he played a crucial role in founding BRICS as a platform for emerging economies to assert their voices on the world stage. Originally conceived as a counterweight to the G-7, BRICS has since evolved into a counterbalance to the US and Western nations, driven largely by China’s growing dominance within the group. For its part, Brazil also uses BRICS to advance a longstanding foreign policy goal: securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. This ambition has been supported in several BRICS communiqués, including the Declaration from the 2023 Summit in South Africa.
Lula da Silva’s administration is keen to preserve a stable political dialogue with Russia, a fellow BRICS member. Brazil, along with authoritarian regimes like Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua, welcomed Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov for official visits in April 2023 and February 2024.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, trade cooperation between Brazil and Russia has notably expanded. By 2023, Russia had emerged as one of Brazil’s top five import sources, largely due to Brazil’s agricultural sector’s heavy reliance on Russian fertiliser supplies.
How does Brazil view Russian aggression against Ukraine?
In Brazil, the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine has attracted substantial media attention. Major Brazilian publications such as O Globo, Estadao, and Folha de Sao Paulo have generally provided accurate reporting on the conflict. Nevertheless, Russian media outlets, including RT Brasil and Sputnik Brasil, have actively sought to undermine Ukraine’s image in Brazil. While these Russian agencies do not dominate the country’s media landscape, they have successfully propagated disinformation through certain local channels, such as Brasil de Fato. The prevalent anti-American and anti-NATO sentiments in Brazil have further facilitated the dissemination of narratives portraying the war as a “proxy conflict” between Russia and the United States.
Such perceptions were evident during a June 2024 advocacy visit by Ukrainian experts to Brazil, organised by the Foreign Policy Council Ukrainian Prism. Throughout this visit, both Brazilian political elites and the expert community often referred to the Russian invasion as the “conflict in Ukraine” or “war in Ukraine,” without clearly identifying Russia as the aggressor. While Brazilians express admiration for the resilience of Ukrainians in this brutal conflict, they also endeavour to maintain a stance of neutrality. The geographical distance, entrenched foreign policy traditions, and pressing domestic concerns contribute to a relatively muted level of interest among Brazilians regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
It is noteworthy that Brazilian representatives have demonstrated a strong interest in issues concerning energy, nuclear, and food security—areas significantly threatened by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This emerging focus indicates a potential shift in dynamics and presents an opportunity to engage Brazil through these critical areas and specific points of entry. However, the key question remains: what resources is Ukraine prepared to invest to deepen Brazil’s involvement in these sectors? For the Ukrainian diplomatic team in Brazil, which also covers Guyana, Suriname, and Bolivia, navigating this challenge represents a significant and complex task.
