On July 11, 2024, in Washington, the 75th anniversary NATO summit drew to a close with a clear focus on containing Russia and China while bolstering support for Ukraine. As anticipated, Ukraine did not receive the invitation to join the Alliance, but it secured additional assistance and a revamped framework for closer coordination with Western allies in defence. This effort to bolster Ukraine was called a “bridge” leading towards “open doors” of NATO on the other side, although the exact length and durability of this bridge remain uncertain even to its architects.
Regarding the “general technical specifications” of NATO accession
Accession to NATO hinges on Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which outlines the “open door” principle for any European nation capable of upholding the treaty’s principles and bolstering security in the North Atlantic region.
Today, many experts and politicians highlight Ukraine’s Armed Forces as the largest and most seasoned army in Europe. This recognition was noted by Czech Republic President Petr Pavel during the NATO summit, emphasising that NATO allies can benefit from the experience gained by Ukraine’s military. However, Pavel cautioned against the metaphor of a “bridge to NATO,” pointing out, “A bridge, as we know, can easily be demolished.”
In 2024, Ukraine’s Armed Forces made a significant leap in European rankings, climbing to 4th place according to Global Firepower, up from 22nd in 2021. This remarkable ascent follows substantial financial and material support from Western allies, underscoring Ukraine’s growing military capability on the European stage.
Since 2015, Ukraine has consistently exceeded the 2% threshold for defence spending in line with NATO recommendations, nearing 3% of its GDP, with 2024 seeing defence expenditures reach 21.6% amidst ongoing conflict. Comparatively, only 23 of NATO’s 32 members are meeting or surpassing the two per cent target this year, a sharp contrast to just three nations in 2014.
A substantial portion—no less than 20%—of NATO countries’ defence budgets should be dedicated to procuring new armaments through research and development.
Becoming a NATO member involves navigating through several crucial stages. It all starts with an official invitation to begin negotiations at NATO headquarters in Brussels, where the candidate country must showcase its readiness to uphold political, legal, and military responsibilities. Securing an invitation sets the stage for potential membership, although it’s important to note that receiving a Membership Action Plan (MAP) doesn’t guarantee automatic entry into the alliance.
In the next phase, the candidate country’s foreign minister submits a letter of intent outlining a roadmap for necessary reforms. These reforms are guided by criteria laid out in the 1995 NATO Enlargement Study, which include maintaining a democratic political system, fostering a market economy, ensuring fair treatment of national minorities, promoting peaceful conflict resolution, demonstrating capability for NATO military operations, and supporting democratic civil-military relations. These benchmarks serve as pivotal markers on the path to NATO integration.
In the subsequent stages, NATO drafts an Accession Protocol as an addendum to the Washington Treaty, which is signed and ratified by all member states. After completing these formalities, member countries inform the United States government, the custodian of the Washington Treaty. Upon verification of all procedures, the Secretary General officially extends an invitation to the aspiring country to join the North Atlantic Treaty. The country then proceeds with its national legislative processes to ratify the Treaty, culminating in official NATO membership upon submission of the accession document to the U.S. State Department.
Yet, for Ukraine, these stages mark the final arduous stretch of the envisioned “bridge,” a journey fraught with challenges akin to the Invictus Games. NATO’s adaptation, navigating between existential threats to Europe and the imperative to avoid direct confrontation with Russia, further complicates the path, often improvising alternatives to formal invitations.
Today, claims about Ukraine’s non-compliance with NATO membership requirenments appear increasingly difficult to justify, given the combat proficiency demonstrated by its Armed Forces in containing a much stronger adversary. Coupled with extensive cooperation with NATO and proficiency in utilising Western military technology, Ukraine’s progress in reform is evident, highlighted by the initiation of EU accession negotiations in 2023.
Since its inception in 1949 with 12 founding nations, NATO has expanded to encompass 32 countries across 10 enlargement phases spanning from 1952 to 2024. A closer examination reveals that decisive factors often transcended strict adherence to formal criteria, instead reflecting geopolitical considerations.
Currently, it seems the Alliance will keep building bridge sections, avoiding the direct path, until there’s a shift in geopolitics. This implies waiting for Russia to either democratise and align with the West, allowing Ukraine’s NATO accession unopposed, or until Russia exhausts itself to the point of no longer posing a threat. Any other scenarios would demand significant boldness from the Alliance.
In light of these possibilities, can Ukraine sustain its resolve to await an invitation, and what implications does this “security bridge” hold for Ukraine?
NATO “Bridges”: The Pontoon Bridge
This type of bridge allows for ‘rapid construction of crossings’, especially crucial in emergencies. In May 2022, Finland and Sweden announced their intentions to join NATO in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Following their participation in the NATO summit in Madrid in June, both countries swiftly concluded accession negotiations at NATO headquarters in Brussels on July 4. The very next day, allies signed Protocols paving the way for their membership after ratification according to allies’ domestic procedures. Despite some obstacles caused by Turkey, Finland officially joined the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 2023, followed by Sweden on March 7, 2024.
While a preemptive scenario is no longer a thing for Ukraine, it hopes to “hop on” into the Alliance according to a similar accelerated procedure without a Membership Action Plan (MAP). Historical precedent, such as Germany’s accession to the Alliance in 1955, even while partially occupied, may also provide valuable lessons.
After this phase of the war ends, NATO could potentially invite Ukraine based on the geographical boundaries of territories under Ukrainian government control while not recognising the legality of the remaining occupied territories, aiming to prevent further aggression. Realistically, this scenario could be contingent upon conditions like Russia’s internal disintegration or a severe economic crisis—outcomes that are hoped for but unpredictable. Another theoretical option might involve seizing the moment after Russia’s capitulation in a global Third World War, though such a war could mark humanity’s final war without victors.
The Beam Bridge
This type of bridge varies from simple wooden planks over puddles to modern structures like the pedestrian-cycling bridge over Volodymyrska Hill in Kyiv or the Pontchartrain, the world’s longest beam bridge spanning 38 kilometres in Louisiana, USA.
Greece, Turkey, and Spain walked down a straight path into NATO. Greece and Turkey received invitations in 1952 due to their strategic positions: Greece in Southern Europe and Turkey at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, near the USSR. Their membership was crucial during the Cold War for containing Soviet influence in the Mediterranean and Balkans, bolstering NATO’s southeastern defences, and establishing a presence in the Black Sea.
Spain’s invitation in 1982 followed democratic reforms after Francisco Franco’s dictatorship. Spain’s integration into Western Europe was enhanced, and NATO gained additional Mediterranean bases through its accession.
The invitations to join NATO in these countries were strategic decisions made against the backdrop of anti-communist, pro-American, or pro-democratic sentiments. These moves aimed to bolster the Alliance’s defence capabilities and extend its influence during the Cold War era, all while avoiding direct conflict with the USSR.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 marked the symbolic end of the Cold War, leading to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. Germany’s reunification in October 1990 paved the way for the inclusion of Eastern territories into NATO. The weakening of the USSR and later Russia created opportunities for this and subsequent expansions.
Following the 1995 NATO enlargement study, the Alliance initiated accession negotiations with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland at the 1997 NATO Summit in Madrid. These three countries, former members of the Warsaw Pact, had expressed intentions to join as early as 1991 and achieved membership eight years later. The U.S. advocated to prevent a potential security void in Central Europe, particularly amidst the First Chechen War, prompting these nations in Russia’s sphere of influence to accelerate their path towards NATO membership.
In the early 1990s, political analysts debated the merits of enlargement, weighing the escalating costs, potential strain on relations with Russia, and the perceived lack of a tangible threat from Russia. At the time, Russia lacked the resources to significantly oppose NATO’s expansion, with its real GDP only beginning to recover and grow notably from 2003 onwards, spurred by surging oil prices in the late 2000s.
Therefore, these countries’ accession did not entail a direct confrontation with Russia or carry the same risks as inviting Ukraine into NATO.
The Arch Bridge
This type of bridge is a timeless classic, though today we often see it in metal structures. It offers a more sophisticated solution compared to beam bridges, as an arch is inherently self-supporting. For instance, consider the picturesque Ponte Vecchio, a 95-meter stone bridge with three arches in Florence, or the modern nearly kilometre-long arch bridge spanning the Yangtze River.
At the Washington Summit in April 1999, NATO introduced the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to prepare countries aspiring to join the Alliance, drawing from lessons learned in previous waves of enlargement.
MAP facilitated the accession preparations for seven countries—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—which embarked on their paths in 2002 and became NATO members by 2004. Albania and Croatia also followed suit, joining in April 2009. Montenegro, having received its plan in 2009, joined the Alliance in 2017. North Macedonia, a NATO member since 2020, started its journey with MAP in 1999. Since 2010, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been working through its MAP process.
At the landmark NATO summit in 2008, Ukraine was denied a Membership Action Plan (MAP). However, following a full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, Ukraine submitted an application for NATO membership under an accelerated procedure without a MAP. Expert opinions were divided on this matter. Some hoped that at the landmark summit, NATO partners would demonstrate boldness in allowing Ukraine to “leap” into the Alliance. Others recognised that geopolitical calculations and the absence of specific requirements to assess the country’s readiness for membership expanded opportunities for political manoeuvres.
The Suspension Bridge
Modern suspension bridges represent engineering marvels due to their ability to span long distances without additional supports, prized for their flexibility under heavy loads. The iconic Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco stands as a prime example. However, the earliest suspension bridges were crafted from ropes and wooden planks, like the Hussaini Bridge in Pakistan, which continues to leave a lasting impression on daring adventurers who traverse its precarious path.
Ukraine’s journey mirrors the crossing of such a bridge—long, daunting, with uncertainty looming over its completion.
In 1992, Ukraine initiated formal relations with NATO by joining the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and in 1994, the Partnership for Peace program. Concurrently, Ukraine developed its first Individual Partnership Program with NATO, establishing its initial liaison officers at NATO headquarters.
In 1997, during the NATO summit in Madrid, the Charter on Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine was signed, establishing the NATO-Ukraine Commission as the principal body for fostering bilateral relations. Concurrently, the NATO Information and Documentation Center opened in Kyiv, engaging in educational initiatives to dispel Cold War-era stereotypes. Ukraine also inaugurated its Mission to NATO, one of the initial representations of non-member states at NATO headquarters. Subsequently, in 1999, the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine commenced operations to enhance political dialogue and practical cooperation.
In 2002, ahead of NATO’s eastward expansion, Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council adopted the “State Strategy of Ukraine towards NATO,” marking a shift from non-aligned policies towards pursuing full membership aspirations.
During the same period, the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan was adopted, initiating the formulation of annual Ukraine-NATO Target Plans. By 2004, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine ratified the Memorandum of Understanding to support NATO operations, while the Joint Working Group Ukraine-NATO on defense-technical cooperation began its collaborative efforts.
In 2005, in Vilnius, a meeting of the Ukraine-NATO Commission took place, marking the beginning of an Intensified Dialogue with NATO covering membership issues and comprehensive reform programs.
The parliamentary elections of 2006 in Ukraine, won by pro-Russian forces, caused a deceleration in the country’s path towards NATO. Nonetheless, in 2008, despite opposition from the Party of Regions, Ukraine formally applied for inclusion in the “Membership Action Plan” during the pivotal Bucharest Summit. However, the summit only made ambiguous statements regarding potential future membership. President Yushchenko noted that Ukraine did everything it could have done, emphasising that the final say depended on the political will of NATO member states. Later that year, Ukraine introduced a practical mechanism for implementing reforms known as the Annual National Programs, which NATO allies would annually assess, basically replacing the Membership Action Plan.
During Viktor Yanukovych’s presidency in 2010, Ukraine maintained cooperation with NATO but ceased pursuing membership aspirations. Concurrently, the country’s strategic partnership with Russia deepened.
Following the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada repealed its non-aligned status, intensified efforts to align with NATO standards, and engaged in joint exercises. However, the Alliance had already established boundaries in cooperation due to Russia’s actions, such as supplying specific weaponry or discussing Ukraine’s NATO accession. In 2016, the Agreement between Ukraine and NATO on the NATO Representation’s status took effect, coinciding with the introduction of the Ukraine-NATO Platform at the Warsaw Summit to combat hybrid warfare. In 2019, amendments to Ukraine’s Constitution were ratified, affirming Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic and European aspirations and reiterating the goal of achieving a Membership Action Plan (MAP).
The subsequent year, Ukraine joined NATO’s Enhanced Opportunities Partnership, bolstering military-political dialogue and expanding participation in interoperability programs and training. At the 2021 Summit, amid Russia’s objections, bold affirmations were made regarding Ukraine’s future with NATO, although specific conditions or timelines for accession were not delineated.
In the initial months following the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion, NATO’s hesitancy to take decisive action to support Ukraine was apparent, especially concerning measures like enforcing a no-fly zone, urgently deploying fighter jets, and supplying substantial weaponry. Jens Stoltenberg acknowledged NATO’s efforts, stating to Euronews on March 25, 2022, that the Alliance was providing assistance “to the fullest extent possible.”
In the autumn of 2022, Ukraine formally applied for expedited NATO membership. However, consensus within the Alliance regarding Ukraine’s invitation remained elusive, with membership now linked to achieving success in the conflict. The emotionally charged NATO Summit in Vilnius in 2023 marked a pivotal moment, where the creation of the Ukraine-NATO Council was announced alongside the possibility of Ukraine joining without a Membership Action Plan (MAP) “upon agreement by member states and fulfilment of conditions.” Unlike its predecessor, this new Council format positions Ukraine as an equal participant alongside all NATO member states.
This year’s NATO Summit notably refrained from discussing Ukraine’s invitation, yet it sent another ‘strong signal’ to Putin through its declaration: “We will continue to support Ukraine on its irreversible path to full Euro-Atlantic integration, including NATO membership.” Nevertheless, significant developments include the approval of the Ukraine Compact, enhancing security architecture, and the establishment of NATO’s NSATU mission with headquarters in Germany to coordinate long-term partner assistance. Anticipated changes in NATO’s presence in Kyiv suggest both qualitative and quantitative advancements.
The transformation of the NATO Representation in Ukraine into a Special Representative of the NATO Secretary General underscores these shifts. Furthermore, Ukraine signed 22 bilateral agreements on security cooperation with Western partners throughout the year. While NATO’s role in bolstering Ukraine’s security sector is crucial, it diverges from the conventional path of Partnership for Peace (PfP) – Membership Action Plan (MAP) – Invitation – Membership. Instead, NATO seems to be exploring new avenues, allowing Ukraine to align and synchronise effectively while awaiting an invitation contingent on unpredictable geopolitical opportunities.
This perspective is echoed in a recent statement by President Biden: “Peace looks like making sure Russia never, never, never, never occupies Ukraine. That’s what peace looks like. And it doesn’t mean [that Ukraine becomes a member of] NATO. It means we have a relationship with them like we do with other countries, where we supply weapons so they can defend themselves in the future.”
The decision made at this year’s Summit in Washington aims to “swiftly and collectively convene at the highest level in the event of another armed attack by Russia on Ukraine following the current military actions. The aim is to determine appropriate next steps to support Ukraine in exercising its right to self-defence, as outlined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.” This underscores a cautious approach to extending security guarantees to Ukraine.
Nevertheless, NATO has diligently focused on enhancing Ukraine’s defence capabilities over the years. Following the NATO Summit in Warsaw in 2016, practical support was formalised through the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP). At the Madrid Summit in 2022, CAP was further strengthened, and the subsequent Vilnius Summit in the following year saw CAP evolve into a multi-year assistance program aimed at achieving full operational compatibility with NATO.
According to European Pravda, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis acknowledged during the summit discussions that the concept of a “pathway to membership” was a diplomatic response to NATO’s need for more effective initiatives. “The circumstances demanded to provide Ukraine with at least something; hence, the ‘bridge’ came into play,” he explained.
