Since 2022, Ukraine has undergone a notable shift in its diplomatic strategy, actively broadening its network of alliances and partnerships worldwide. Australia is among the nations gaining prominence in Ukrainian foreign policy.
Australia holds a distinct position on the global stage. Situated in the East yet aligned with the collective West and located in the South while being part of the Global North, its unique geographical and political positioning presents a gateway for Ukraine to engage with the expansive Indo-Pacific region and Southeast Asia as a whole.
Unlike us, Australians have a clear understanding of both of these regions. Unlike the USA and the UK, Australians are much less criticised for colonialism and neocolonialism, as well as for hypocrisy in their foreign policy. Being Ukraine’s reliable ally, Australia can help better understand these regions and how to work with them, as it is its natural sphere of interaction, just as Europe is for us. At the same time, Australia can also help advance the Ukrainian agenda in the region, having the trust of states as one of the stable partners in this part of the world.
Despite its distant geographical location, this Pacific country has already made a significant contribution to countering Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Ukraine’s biggest ally outside NATO
In 2022, following the onset of the full-scale Russian invasion, Australia, much like numerous other nations, immediately offered its assistance to Ukraine. This support ranged from backing Ukraine’s initiatives in the UN General Assembly to supporting investigations led by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court into the abduction of Ukrainian children and Ukraine’s legal proceedings against the Russian Federation in the International Court of Justice. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese notably made the first visit to Ukraine since its independence. Furthermore, Australia imposed sanctions on numerous Russian individuals and entities and froze tens of millions of dollars of Russian funds in Australia. However, despite occasional encouragement to do so, the Australian Embassy remains one of the last Western embassies yet to reinstate its activities in Kyiv.
Beyond purely political cooperation, Australia has provided over $600 million in support to Ukraine, of which nearly $500 million was solely military aid. The most well-known weaponry provided by Australia is the Bushmaster armoured vehicles, which have proven themselves excellently on the battlefield. There are also positive reviews for the so-called cardboard drones, which inflict significant damage on Russian forces and are practically impossible to detect on the radar. As a result of this aid, Australia has earned its reputation as Ukraine’s primary donor outside of NATO for quite some time. Currently, Australia holds the sixth position among non-NATO allies in terms of support. Ukraine could further seek to involve Australia in the Czech ammunition initiative. This initiative allows the Czech Republic to procure up to one and a half million rounds for Ukraine. This collaboration offers opportunities for both financial contributions and bolstering the overall quantity of ammunition, including domestically produced supplies.
Economically, Australia played a crucial role in assisting Ukraine during the harsh winter of 2022-2023 by supplying over 79 thousand tons of coal. This support helped mitigate the deficit in our energy system.
In 2022, Ukraine saw a nearly 40% increase in imports from Australia compared to the previous year. Australian entrepreneur Andrew Forrest committed to investing over $500 million in the Ukraine Development Fund during the Ukraine Recovery Conference in London in 2023. Additionally, Australia opened its doors to over 11 thousand Ukrainian refugees, granting them humanitarian visas. However, Australia’s participation as a nation in Ukraine’s recovery has been relatively limited thus far, both in terms of regional assistance and the involvement of Australian companies in reconstruction tenders.
Throughout the two years of full-scale war, public backing for Ukraine among Australians has remained remarkably strong. Currently, 85% support upholding sanctions against Russia, 84% endorse aiding refugees, and 76% favour extending military assistance to Ukraine. However, there has been a slight dip in each of these figures compared to 2022. In 2024, Australia’s support for us persists, albeit at the bare minimum level required.
International relations have always been pragmatic, but in recent years, they’ve shifted towards becoming more transactional. Each participant now comprehends the potential benefits of specific actions or events.
As we enter the third year of full-scale war, it’s crucial to recognise that emotions hold far less sway than they did two years ago. We must craft a clear and rational strategy for engaging with all stakeholders, ensuring we understand precisely whom and what we can offer in our interactions.
Proximity in distance
Australia’s involvement in Ukrainian affairs gained significant momentum in July 2014, triggered by the tragic downing of a Malaysian Airlines flight, which claimed the lives of 38 Australians. This event marked a pivotal moment, making the war deeply personal for Australia as well. Despite the considerable geographic distance of 12,000 kilometres, it would be unrealistic to assume that we are a top priority in Australian foreign policy. Hence, it’s imperative for us to cultivate a precise understanding of Australian interests and explore avenues through which we can mutually benefit each other, just as they can offer assistance to us.
Currently, Australians are much more focused on the Indo-Pacific region than on European affairs and are concerned about whether the world’s attention (and that of the US) will be diverted from their region, where the biggest challenge (and, at the same time their biggest trade partner) is China.
Australians have a clear understanding that events occurring across the globe are intricately connected, even if they may appear to be disparate and unrelated at first glance. What happens in Europe can resonate in the Indo-Pacific region, events in the Black Sea can affect developments in the South China Sea, and the situation on the front lines in Ukraine is closely monitored by the People’s Liberation Army of China. Not to mention that a very clear axis is forming with Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, and three of these countries are directly related to the region.
We may sometimes overlook the fact that Russia is, in essence, a Pacific state. Just because its historical focus lies on the European theatre doesn’t mean it lacks interest in the Pacific Ocean. With a formidable fleet and alliances within the newly formed “Axis of Evil,” Russian aggression is undeniably a Pacific issue as well.
Furthermore, our Australian partners should consider that the conflict in Europe is diverting attention, along with human, time, and financial resources, from China and the Pacific region. Therefore, it would be pragmatic to support Ukraine in its fight and then shift focus effortlessly to Pacific matters.
Interestingly, until recently, Central and Eastern Europe didn’t hold much interest for Australia. In the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was little demand for studies on the region. The field was deemed unpromising, mirroring trends in many Western countries. Consequently, Australia, like much of the world, essentially overlooked the resurgence of revanchism in Russia.
Another issue troubling Canberra is Russia’s nuclear blackmail. Essentially, China’s stance towards Russia, indicating that the use of nuclear weapons is unacceptable (resulting in a notable decrease in nuclear threats), has shifted the red lines. Previously, the red line was perceived as an attack on a neighbouring state, whereas now, it’s the use of nuclear weapons. This shift undermines progress towards non-proliferation, suggesting that only nuclear weapons can safeguard a smaller state from a larger one. Furthermore, discussions on tactical and strategic nuclear weapons seem to normalise their use, almost downgrading them to conventional arms. Given Australia’s concerns about this situation, collaborative efforts can be initiated to counter the manipulation of nuclear security.
For instance, President Zelensky’s Peace Formula includes a provision to ensure nuclear and radiation safety, presenting an opportunity for joint efforts between Kyiv and Canberra.
Australia may also find the issue of maritime security intriguing. Ukraine’s expertise in navigating maritime blockades and advancing maritime drone technology could be especially pertinent for the region, where China’s assertiveness at sea is growing. Likewise, Ukraine’s strategies in countering cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns, often employed by China, offer valuable insights for Australia.
Although Ukraine and Australia are separated by over ten thousand kilometres, there are points of intersection that can benefit both nations. Our diplomacy should focus on developing these common interests and strengthening our presence in the Pacific region.
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This text is part of the New Global Partnerships – Expert Diplomacy and Advocacy project, which is supported by the International Renaissance Foundation. The material presents the author’s views and not necessarily those of the International Renaissance Foundation.
