“On September 3rd, Russian President Vladimir Putin is set to undertake an official visit to Mongolia, despite the country’s membership in the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has issued an arrest warrant for him on charges of war crimes. Under the Rome Statute, member states are obliged to enforce such warrants if the accused is present on their territory.
The Kremlin has dismissed concerns over Putin’s potential arrest. ‘There is no cause for concern; our dialogue with Mongolian counterparts is excellent. Every aspect of the visit has been meticulously planned,’ Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov asserted.”
The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has urged the Mongolian government to recognise Vladimir Putin as a war criminal, underscoring the severity of the allegations. ‘The abduction of Ukrainian children is but one of the many crimes for which Putin and Russia’s military-political leadership must be held accountable. These figures stand accused of waging an aggressive war against Ukraine, perpetrating atrocities including murder, rape, looting, the bombardment of civilian infrastructure, and genocide,’ the ministry declared. It called on Mongolian authorities to honour the binding international arrest warrant and surrender Putin to the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
Putin’s arrest in Mongolia: is it even possible?
Vladimir Putin’s forthcoming visit to Mongolia is ostensibly to mark the 85th anniversary of the battles at the Khalkhin Gol River. Oleksandr Merezhko, Chairman of the Foreign Policy and Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, has suggested that this occasion is a ‘deliberately orchestrated provocation designed to undermine the authority of the ICC and signal that certain nations are prepared to flout their international obligations to accommodate the Kremlin’s agenda.’
Merezhko pointed out the anomaly of commemorating the 85th anniversary rather than a more significant milestone such as the 80th or 90th. ‘The choice of this particular anniversary seems contrived, indicating that the real intent behind the visit is to pressure Mongolia into setting a dangerous precedent by failing to honour its commitment to execute the arrest warrant against the war criminal Putin,’ he argued.
He further noted that such tactics had previously failed with South Africa and Brazil, which upheld international law despite Kremlin efforts. In contrast, Mongolia may be more susceptible to the Kremlin’s coercion and diplomatic pressure.
Journalist Vitaly Portnikov has characterised Vladimir Putin’s visit to Mongolia as another effort to undermine international law and discredit the International Criminal Court (ICC). He suggests that the Kremlin’s underlying aim is to render arrest warrants meaningless.
Portnikov argues that Mongolia’s President, Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh, is unlikely to obstruct Putin’s agenda. ‘Khurelsukh’s background as a former leader of the Mongolian People’s Party—a pro-Soviet faction associated with Khorloogiin Choibalsan and Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal, who led Mongolia during its decades of Soviet dependence—casts doubt on his willingness to challenge Moscow. This historical context highlights Mongolia’s continued struggle to assert itself as a fully autonomous entity on the international stage,’ Portnikov noted.
Meanwhile, Maria Elena Vignoli, Senior International Justice Counsel at Human Rights Watch, warned that Mongolia would breach its international obligations as an ICC member if it permits Putin’s visit without arresting him. ‘Allowing Putin, who is actively evading the ICC, to enter the country would not only affront the victims of Russian military crimes but also undermine the fundamental principle that no individual, regardless of their power, is above the law,’ Vignoli told Politico.
Article 10 of the Mongolian Constitution is a key consideration, which mandates the country’s adherence to its international treaty obligations. This provision underscores the importance of Mongolia not only honouring its commitments under the Rome Statute but also adhering to its own constitutional principles.
“We should observe whether Mongolia will uphold its obligations under both the Rome Statute and its Constitution,” Merezhko stated. “Adherence to international legal commitments and treaties is a crucial indicator of a nation’s integrity as a genuine democratic state governed by the rule of law.”
What if Mongolia doesn’t arrest Putin?
“The likelihood of Vladimir Putin being detained during his upcoming visit to Mongolia appears remote. Bloomberg reports that the Kremlin leader has secured assurances that he will not face arrest. ‘There is no risk of Putin being detained. Prior to any international visits, the terms of the negotiation are thoroughly established, and the host nation guarantees that neither Putin nor any member of his delegation will be subject to arrest,’ asserted Sergei Markov, a political consultant with close ties to the Kremlin.
Additionally, Fadi El-Abdallah, a spokesperson for the International Criminal Court (ICC), underscored in a BBC interview that member states, including Mongolia, ‘are required to cooperate under Chapter IX of the Rome Statute.’ This provision allows for exceptions under specific circumstances, such as when fulfilling an arrest warrant might ‘breach treaty obligations’ with another state or violate ‘diplomatic immunity’ protections for individuals or property from third countries.”
“Should Mongolia refuse to cooperate, ICC judges may draw appropriate conclusions and report the matter to the Assembly of States Parties. The Assembly, in turn, has the authority to implement any measures it deems necessary, according to an ICC spokesperson.
Oleksandr Merezhko notes that if Mongolia fails to enforce the ICC-issued arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, Ukraine, as a state party to the Rome Statute, has recourse to protect its interests. Article 119(2) of the Rome Statute outlines the process: ‘Any dispute between two or more State Parties regarding the interpretation or application of this Statute, unresolved through negotiations within three months, shall be referred to the Assembly of States Parties. The Assembly may then either seek to resolve the dispute itself or recommend further means of resolution, including referring the matter to the International Court of Justice under its Statute.'”
Meanwhile, Merezhko asserts that initial efforts should focus on engaging Mongolia in negotiations to persuade it to execute the arrest warrant. “Should these negotiations fail to achieve the desired outcome, Ukraine could escalate the matter to the Assembly of States Parties, scheduled to convene later this year. Furthermore, Article 119 of the Rome Statute provides the option to appeal to the International Court of Justice. From both a political and psychological standpoint, the mere prospect of Ukraine leveraging these mechanisms may exert sufficient pressure on Mongolia to either cancel Putin’s visit or enforce the arrest warrant,” Merezhko posits.
