On Saturday, April 6, Slovakia saw its second round of presidential elections, resulting in the victory of Peter Pellegrini, an ally of the current Prime Minister Robert Fico and the Speaker of the Slovak Parliament. This win solidifies Robert Fico’s position and that of his government, which has been met with resistance from a significant portion of the country. This resistance was evident in protests even before the presidential elections began, and it carried through to the voting results of the second round: Peter Pellegrini garnered support from 1.4 million voters, while his opponent, liberal diplomat Ivan Korčok, received 1.2 million votes. The Russian-Ukrainian war emerged as a central theme in the pre-election discussions of this campaign.
The question now lingers: how will Slovakia’s internal politics shift following the election of President Peter Pellegrini and the consolidation of power by Prime Minister Fico? What impact will this have on Ukrainian-Slovak relations and Bratislava’s military support to Ukraine? Is Robert Fico poised to become another Viktor Orban of Eastern Europe? Alexander Duleba, a Slovakian political scientist and professor at Presov University, who heads the Eastern Europe unit at the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, addresses these questions in an interview with The Ukrainian Week.
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– The turnout for Slovakia’s presidential elections on April 6 reached over 60% in the second round, marking one of the highest figures in the country’s history. With each candidate garnering more than a million votes of support in a nation with just 4.4 million eligible voters, does this suggest that Slovakia is already politically polarised?
– Yes, this marks the second-largest turnout in the history of our presidential elections. The highest turnout was recorded during the first direct presidential elections back in 1999, reaching over 70%. In recent years, however, turnout has generally been less than 50%. For this election, the turnout was 51% in the first round and increased to 61% in the second. That’s about a 10% rise in voter participation between the two rounds.
A successful mobilisation of votes by the parties of Robert Fico’s government played a role here (in addition to the party led by Prime Minister Robert Fico “Direction–Social Democracy” (SMER-SD), the governing coalition also includes the nationalist Slovak National Party and the left-wing “Voice – Social Democracy” party). There was a very successful reach out to rural residents. In the cities, the turnout was roughly the same as in the first round. However, the successful rallying of rural residents influenced the election results. Pellegrini clearly won there. And this is the first factor. Why did they succeed in this rallying? Mainly due to the perception that Ivan Korčok is a candidate for war while Pellegrini is a candidate for peace. Literally, if you don’t want your sons and grandsons to go to war in Ukraine, choose Pellegrini. If you want that, choose Korčok.
Here, it’s worth mentioning the highly negative tone of the campaign. By law, there’s a moratorium on pre-election campaigning in the final days leading up to the vote. However, this law specifically pertains to television and radio, leaving social networks unrestricted. Consequently, there was an intense and relentless campaign regarding the war in Ukraine unfolding across social media platforms. This emerged as the central theme dominating discussions online.
The second significant factor shaping the election outcome was the backing garnered by Pellgrini’s supporters (Fico’s government) from the candidate who came third in the initial round – Stefan Garabin. It’s worth noting that Garabin’s beliefs embody an extreme version of 19th-century Slovak nationalism. This ideology encompasses staunchly conservative and Russophile perspectives; adherents see the Slovak mission as unifying the Slavic world under Russia’s guidance. They argue that Slovakia requires Russia to counterbalance Western pressures, historically from the Germans and Hungarians. Presently, Garabin views NATO as a criminal entity and advocates for Slovakia’s exit from the European Union.
In the first round, this candidate secured over 11% of the vote. While not explicitly endorsing Pellgrini, he raised concerns about the personal life of the newly elected president. Peter Pellegrini is openly gay, a fact that doesn’t align well with the traditional values and 19th-century conservative outlook of Garabin’s supporters. Instead, he advised his followers to opt for the lesser of two evils. In their view, Korchok represented the greater evil, while Pellegrini was seen as the lesser one. This strategic shift in support proved effective.
The third key factor revolves around the candidate who garnered 7% of the vote in the initial round and secured the fourth position – Kristian Forro, leader of the Hungarian Alliance party, representing the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. It’s evident that they have ties to Viktor Orban, who wields considerable influence over the actions of Hungarians in Slovakia, particularly concerning their political representation. This is especially notable as the Slovak law’s moratorium does not extend to Hungary.
So, during those two days when the moratorium was in place on Slovak television, a Hungarian video featuring a 30-minute interview with Pellegrini was aired every hour or so. This interview targeted the Hungarians in Slovakia, highlighting his qualities as a candidate and the strong rapport he would have with Orban, among other things. Consequently, in the southern regions where Forro had the strongest backing in the initial round, Pellegrini emerged victorious in the second round.
In summary, these three factors shaped the outcome of the second round of the presidential elections in Slovakia.
– Sure, since Slovakia operates as a parliamentary republic, the president’s role tends to have a more ceremonial character. However, the significant voter turnout suggests that it was crucial for citizens to make their voices heard. Apart from the symbolic significance, are there any other aspects that this election might reveal?
– Absolutely, this outcome highlights the divide between urban and rural areas, illustrating a clear polarization along these lines. The rural regions feel a disconnect with Bratislava, the capital. Ivan Korčok emerged victorious in Košice, Prešov, and various other significant urban centres in Slovakia, including, of course, Bratislava.
Secondly, disinformation played its role. The interpretation of Russia’s war against Ukraine, which Fico is currently proposing, closely resembles the technologies used by the Kremlin (and I have been following Russian politics since 1993). There, during the 1996 elections, where Gennady Zyuganov and Boris Yeltsin were the main contenders, the dilemma of war was crucial. How do we formulate this for the population? It is clear that the first thing people feel in connection with war is fear. So, you simply scare people and then say you are the right candidate: choose me, and I will protect you. These 10% of voters from rural areas were mobilised precisely by such technology literally in the last few days before the elections.
– Can we say after these elections that Slovakia has definitively taken the path of Orban, or does the opposition still have some opportunities to pressure the government?
– There are always avenues for applying pressure. Organising protests is one such option. Looking at the voting numbers, Korchok garnered 1.2 million votes, while Pellegrini secured 1.4 million. That’s about half of the total eligible voting population. It paints a picture of a nation split down the middle. These elections also acted as a sort of referendum on the Fico government. You mentioned the president as a figure with mainly ceremonial duties, but that’s not the full story. The president holds significant sway over certain appointments, for instance. For instance, when the Fico government nominated a new head of Slovak intelligence, the current president, Zuzana Čaputová, voiced her disagreement with the choice. This falls under the joint authority of the government and the president. If either party dissents, the appointment doesn’t proceed. Presently, the appointee has only been confirmed as a deputy, but once Pellegrini assumes the presidency officially, he will be ratified. The same holds true for the General Prosecutor. It’s also a joint responsibility of parliament and the president. Just like the selection of judges for the Supreme and Constitutional Courts or the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Thus, the president wields significant influence over these nominations. The president’s role is crucial in government formation. They set the terms for negotiations, deciding who gets the first shot at forming a government and how much time is allowed for this process.
Having a loyal president is crucial for Robert Fico, particularly as he looks towards the upcoming elections. So, now he truly holds a monopoly on power. From the standpoint of Slovakia’s internal politics, this situation is bound to be quite problematic. Indeed, there is already a drafted law concerning the nationalisation of television, which presently operates as a public institution. The Fico-led government, however, aims to transform it into a state-owned enterprise. Moreover, there’s noticeable pressure mounting on private media, including the widely popular channel Markiza, along with the TV channel Joj.
The Slovak National Party has also drafted a law concerning non-governmental organizations, including a provision stipulating that if an NGO receives support exceeding €5,000 from a foreign donor, it must declare itself as an organization with foreign backing. Presently, Fico finds the pathway clear to attempt moulding Slovakia akin to Hungary in terms of its political system’s operation. Thus, a battle lies ahead. However, the significant distinction is that he lacks the constitutional majority enjoyed by Viktor Orban. Slovakia stands divided down the middle.
Even prior to the elections, the opposition had rallied protests against amendments to the criminal code. Subsequently, the Fico government annulled the operations of the special prosecutor’s office, a crucial institution for Slovakia, given its unresolved corruption issues, which are keenly felt by the populace. Yet, in spite of all this, they simply dismantled it. This marked the initial offensive by the Fico government, followed by assaults on public broadcasting, and now the focus is shifting to the media and NGOs. Thus, everything unfolds step by step, following the script of Orban and Putinism. Following these elections, he will enjoy unwavering support from Pellegrini. This is the future that awaits us in Slovakia, and it’s deeply concerning for us.
From a foreign policy perspective, I don’t expect anything different from what we’ve already seen regarding the war. Robert Fico appears to support Viktor Orban’s stance. However, even with this alignment, during a summit in early February to decide on providing Ukraine with a €50 billion aid package, Fico remained silent. He didn’t engage in the discussions and didn’t back Orban or any others. Fico states he supports Ukraine’s integration into Europe, meaning joining the EU but not NATO.
In the upcoming days, there’s a scheduled meeting between the Slovak government and the Ukrainian government delegation led by Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal. The meeting is set to happen in Mykhailivtsi, a town on the border of the two states from the Slovak side.
— What will they discuss at the meeting?
– They will be discussing, among other things, projects under the European Connecting Facility. This is a specific program available to Ukraine, and its neighbouring EU member states—Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. The program allocates around €97 million for us to collaborate on developing border infrastructure. For instance, there are plans to enhance railway connections, including the introduction of a direct train service from Kyiv to Košice, allowing Ukrainians to access the Košice airport. There are also various other projects on the agenda.
I was quite impressed by how Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal described Robert Fico’s approach as “new pragmatism” after their initial meeting. It’s a term I haven’t come across in our Slovak-Ukrainian relations despite following them since 1993. But I see what Mr Shmyhal was getting at: Fico, on the one hand, declares “no ammunition for Ukraine,” yet on the other, Slovakia is actively manufacturing ammunition. It would be ideal if all European nations produced ammunition as efficiently as Slovakia does; then, I believe the supply chain would be much smoother. Fico claims that no ammunition has left Slovakia’s state arsenal. However, there is a surge in the production of new ammunition, a task undertaken by four companies. Before the conflict, there was just one firm producing under 10,000 units annually. Last year, this figure rose to 50,000, and this year it’s expected to reach 150,000. There’s also the ongoing production of howitzers, a process that Fico shows no signs of halting. This manufacturing is being funded by the governments of Germany, Denmark, and Norway.
– Are the manufacturing companies Slovak? And are there jobs also meant for Slovaks?
– Yes, but there are some issues. For instance, during Eduard Heger’s government tenure (from April 1, 2021, to May 2023), we supplied eight new howitzers fresh from production. However, these howitzers were ordered by the government back in 2018, and the manufacturer could only deliver them in April 2022.
Now, this manufacturer is expanding its capacity to produce sixteen units per year. However, there’s also the need to fine-tune production, and there’s a shortage of parts. I recently learned that there’s a company in Slovenia producing crucial components for tanks and howitzers, and due to the high demand, they simply can’t keep up with producing enough. This has an impact on other productions as well.
In Slovakia, they’re fixing up Western military gear damaged in Ukraine. This is what Denys Shmyhal referred to as “new pragmatism.” Because, on one side, Robert Fico says, “no ammunition for Ukraine, we’re all about peace,” but on the flip side (and as Ivan Korčok highlighted during his campaign), Slovakia has shipped weapons worth €0.5 billion to Ukraine since October 2023.
So, there’s this crazy dichotomy here. Fico says one thing, but on the ground, Slovakia is still providing all the military support Ukraine needs. And in this, Fico’s stance differs from Orban’s because Hungary really isn’t sending anything Ukraine’s way in terms of war-related aid.
