Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Lavrov’s potential OSCE participation, new methods of Russian societal control, and the DPRK Foreign Minister’s Moscow visit
Domestic policy takeaways:
- New measures to tighten Russian media control. Last week, the Russian government unveiled one of its most effective tools yet for controlling domestic opposition and civil society. This initiative, linked to the so-called foreign agents’ list, targets Russians with severe restrictions on political activity. The Ministry of Justice has now added a new criterion for registering citizens as foreign agents: if an individual is a respondent on a platform provided by an entity already designated as a foreign agent, they too can be added to the list. Despite the significant implications of this development, it received little to no attention in the Russian media.
- This expansion of the foreign agent designation effectively bars those labelled from engaging in any public interactions within Russia. Under the new rule, even a basic conversation between a Russian public figure or politician and a designated foreign agent could trigger their inclusion on the list. This new mechanism for curbing domestic political discourse and managing the media landscape is shaping up to be one of the Russian government’s most powerful control measures to date.
- At the same time, another law aimed at tightening control over Russia’s media landscape took effect last week. The new regulation mandates the registration of owners of Telegram channels and other Russian social media platforms with an audience exceeding 10,000 users. Administrators of these channels must submit a broad range of personal information. This approach provides the authorities with a comprehensive overview of Russia’s media space and equips them with a powerful tool for exerting influence.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Lavrov’s potential participation in the OSCE meeting could serve as a step towards possible ‘peace talks’.Last week, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced that Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov would attend the OSCE Foreign Ministers Council meeting in December, which was set to take place in Malta. Lavrov’s participation marks his first visit to the European Union since the onset of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Russian embassy in Malta also confirmed his attendance, while the OSCE secretariat refrained from elaborating beyond the embassy’s statement.
- Lavrov’s planned appearance raises questions about the personal sanctions placed on him. In 2023, he attended an OSCE meeting in North Macedonia, a country outside the EU, following Poland’s decision to bar him from the 2022 OSCE summit. This evolving situation sheds light on the broader question of how effective sanctions on Russian officials truly are. Austria’s Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg, for example, indicated to the Austrian parliament in early 2023 that Russian representatives might still participate in OSCE meetings despite sanctions. Lavrov’s upcoming attendance may, therefore, serve as a litmus test for the durability of Russia’s international isolation in Europe.
- Meanwhile, it is essential to consider the possibility of renewed negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, as this issue could potentially re-enter the agenda. For instance, last week, Putin once again expressed his “readiness for negotiations.” Ukrainian Prism closely monitors the Kremlin’s rhetoric on peace talks and earlier noted that the BRICS summit in Kazan could become a point of pressure on Moscow from its partners, particularly China. So far, Russian authorities have not reiterated their June ultimatums regarding the annexation of four Ukrainian regions. Putin’s participation and speech at the Valdai Forum on November 7 may provide further insight into the Kremlin’s current stance on negotiations. The Russian president typically makes prominent foreign policy statements at this forum.
- Visit of North Korea’s foreign minister to Russia. Last week, DPRK Foreign Minister Choi Sung-hee visited Russia amid reports of North Korean military involvement against Ukraine in the Kursk region. During her meetings with Russian officials, Choi confirmed that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had “ordered support for the Russian army.” Notably, Choi held a one-on-one meeting with Putin despite prior denials by Russian presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov of any scheduled talks. Overall, the North Korean foreign minister’s visit underscores the continued development of bilateral relations between Russia and the DPRK.
