Every week, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Strengthened Russia-North Korea ties, Moscow’s failed bid for a SWIFT alternative, and the withdrawal of Russian border guards from the Armenian-Iranian border
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Shoigu’s power in the Russian bureaucracy continues to wane. Amid the high-profile arrests of Russian military officials and generals from the circle of former Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu, his grip on power within Russia’s bureaucracy appears to be weakening. Last week, the Ministry of Defence drafted a proposal to abolish the regulation governing the department’s so-called personnel reserve, a policy introduced by Shoigu in 2017. This framework allowed him to create a pool of candidates for positions within the civilian arm of the ministry. Officially, it offered Russians the opportunity to swiftly fill federal civil service vacancies as they arose. However, it was widely understood that such appointments required Shoigu’s personal approval.
- Now, the formation of the personnel reserve has been transferred entirely to the presidential administration, granting the Kremlin direct control over appointments within the Ministry of Defence. This shift not only centralises power but also blocks any potential placements of Shoigu loyalists into new roles.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Putin meets with the Iranian president. Last week, Vladimir Putin met with Iranian President Massoud Peseshkian in an unannounced meeting during his visit to Turkmenistan. This encounter came ahead of previously scheduled bilateral talks at the BRICS summit on 22-24 October. Behind the scenes, recent signs suggest that relations between Russia and Iran have been diverging. In the past two months, Moscow has organised two high-level visits to Tehran—first by Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of the Security Council, and more recently by a government delegation led by Prime Minister Mishustin.
- Ukrainian Prism has analysed these developments in Russian-Iranian relations on multiple occasions. Tensions have surfaced over the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement, particularly regarding the future of the Zangezour Corridor, which could potentially pass through Armenian territory. Moscow is keen to control this infrastructure, thereby securing greater influence over Armenia, while Iran is firmly opposed to any alterations to the region’s geopolitical status quo. It is likely that resolving this disagreement was among the key issues discussed during the Russian delegations’ visits.
- Another significant point of contention is Russia’s push to finalise a strategic partnership agreement with Iran, negotiations for which stalled this summer, likely at Tehran’s behest. Whether or not this agreement is signed could serve as a clear indicator of the true state of Russian-Iranian relations.
- Strengthening relations between Russia and North Korea. On 14 October, Vladimir Putin submitted a draft bill to the Russian parliament to ratify the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement with North Korea. This move coincides with growing speculation about North Korean military involvement in Russia’s war against Ukraine. The South Korean authorities had raised this possibility earlier in October, and Ukrainian intelligence has since reported that several thousand North Korean soldiers are undergoing training in Russia.
- This scenario is legally plausible, as the agreement, signed during Putin’s visit to North Korea in the summer of 2024 and now up for ratification, includes provisions for military assistance between the two states. It offers formal guarantees of mutual support “in the event of aggression against one of the nations.” Should North Korea join Russian forces on the battlefield, it would represent a profound shift in the nature of Moscow-Pyongyang relations.
- North Korea is already supplying substantial quantities of ammunition to Russia, and this development could prompt Ukraine to escalate the issue, potentially raising the question of Western military presence on its soil in response to North Korean involvement.
- Russia attempts to create a SWIFT alternative within BRICS. For some time, Russia has been attempting to establish an alternative payment system to SWIFT, enabling cross-border transactions between participating countries. Holding the BRICS presidency in 2024, Moscow has sought to advance this initiative among the organisation’s members over the past year. Since at least the summer of 2024, Russia has been advocating for the creation of a “BRICS Bridge” system, which it envisions as an alternative to SWIFT. As the organisation’s summit in Kazan, scheduled for 22-24 October, approached, there was an expectation that Moscow would push to include this on the agenda.
- Indeed, last week, Russia convened a meeting of BRICS member states at the level of finance ministers, during which the BRICS Bridge system was formally presented. However, the meeting highlighted the lack of interest from the group’s key members. Notably absent were the finance ministers of China and India, who instead sent lower-ranking representatives, underscoring the tepid reception to Moscow’s proposal.
- Even Russian officials acknowledge the initiative’s limited traction. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov openly remarked that many countries are “very cautious about our initiatives”, given they are not under sanctions and face no restrictions on payments. While the Kremlin is likely to revisit this topic at the upcoming Kazan summit, the prospects for the BRICS Bridge project appear bleak.
- Russia withdraws its troops from the Armenian-Iranian border. The summit of CIS member states held in Russia largely failed to introduce any new issues to the agenda. In reality, the only significant matter discussed was the future of the Zangezour Corridor project, which may potentially traverse Armenian territory. Talks between Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan focused on this sensitive issue, with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan officially stating that his country is prepared to provide a transport corridor from Azerbaijan to its exclave, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. However, Armenia has made clear that it will do so under the same terms as those offered by Iran, meaning the Armenian authorities will retain full control over this section of the border.
- Pashinyan’s remarks also pointed up Yerevan’s refusal to cede control of the Zangezour Corridor to Moscow, confirming that Russian involvement will be limited to the FSB’s monitoring role. This represents a significant setback for Russia, which had sought to leverage the corridor as a means of exerting pressure on Armenia. Adding to the diminishing Russian influence, it has been announced that Russian border guards will be fully withdrawn from the Armenian-Iranian border checkpoints by 1 January 2025, ending a presence that dates back to 1992. This development marks another step in the steady decline of Russian influence over Armenia.
