Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: The political situation involving the Kursk region hostilities, increased Russian nuclear blackmail, and potential Iranian ballistic missile supplies to Russia
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Combat actions in the Kursk region, and analysis of the political and social situation. The recent hostilities in the Kursk region have swiftly emerged as the most significant political event in Russia in recent months. These developments have diverted public attention away from domestic political issues, such as local problems and economic discontent, and redirected it toward the military front. The extraordinary nature of the situation is underscored by the fact that Ukrainian armed forces have launched large-scale military operations within Russia’s borders for the first time, making this an unprecedented and highly impactful event.
- Russian politicians, including President Putin, have revealed their lack of preparedness for this warfare scenario. The federal government has yet to issue any major statements regarding the situation. In his initial response to the Kursk region conflict, Putin downplayed the scale of the confrontation, labelling it a “provocation” rather than a full-scale battle. This response suggests that the Russian General Staff was caught off guard, having underestimated the Ukrainian forces as mere sabotage groups rather than a substantial military threat. Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov further compounded the issue with misleading reports, falsely claiming on the second day of fighting that Ukrainian forces had been “stopped” and that the conflict would soon be contained at the state borders. His downplay of the Ukrainian troop presence and his inaccurate assessments have led to criticism from Russian “war correspondents,” who have blamed him for the breach in the border. Adding to the problem, Bloomberg reported that intelligence had warned Gerasimov of a potential attack two weeks prior, but no adequate response was taken. The Kremlin’s decision to declare a counterterrorist operation rather than martial law in the affected regions of Kursk, Belgorod, and Bryansk shifts the legal responsibility to the FSB and its director, Alexander Bortnikov. This move also suggests that Putin now places greater trust in the FSB, reflecting a shift in his reliance on different security structures.
- Socially, as anticipated, there has been a notable resurgence of public focus on the war. This shift highlights the potential for destabilising elements within Russian society that could be exploited. The situation in the Kursk region has intensified the debate over conscript participation in the conflict, eliciting significant public concern. Previously, President Putin had assured that conscripts would not be involved in combat. However, recent developments suggest that the Russian authorities are neither removing conscripts from the border regions, including Kursk nor reducing their numbers there. Instead, reports indicate an increase in their presence, which has sparked a growing movement among the wives and mothers of military personnel, who are organising protests and advocating for their loved ones. The rising number of internally displaced persons—now exceeding 100,000 evacuated citizens—is another pressing issue. The potential expansion of the combat zone into Belgorod and Bryansk could exacerbate this situation further. Despite these challenges, the plight of internally displaced persons has not received significant media attention or public concern within Russia.
- The situation in the Kursk region has revealed a significant rift within the Russian propaganda machine. Over the past few days, official pro-government TV channels have attempted to downplay the scale of the conflict, framing it as a localised issue. In contrast, a network of so-called Russian “war correspondents” and popular Telegram channel authors have been disseminating information that conveys a sense of near-panic, which starkly contrasts with the official narrative and has captured public attention. During the war, these “war correspondents” have amassed substantial followings and exerted considerable influence over the information landscape in Russia. The Kremlin has made several attempts to bring these voices under control, holding joint meetings to establish a unified information strategy and addressing conflicts between the “war correspondents” and the Ministry of Defense under Sergei Shoigu’s leadership. However, recent events suggest that the Kremlin’s efforts have fallen short. When faced with significant military setbacks, the loyalty of these “war correspondents” to a unified narrative and their cooperation with the Defense Ministry have faltered.
- Given the current circumstances, it is likely that the Kremlin will consider more stringent measures to regulate these influential voices. Early signs of this shift are already emerging in statements from State Duma deputies and prominent propagandists such as Vladimir Solovyov.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Iranian-Russian military cooperation. Moscow may receive ballistic missiles from Iran. Reuters has reported on the potential delivery of hundreds of Iranian Fath-360 ballistic missiles to Russia, which would represent a significant escalation in Russian-Iranian military and political cooperation. According to European intelligence sources cited in the article, several Russian military personnel are already undergoing training for these missiles. Despite Tehran’s repeated public denials of supplying weapons to Russia, substantial evidence suggests otherwise. If these ballistic missiles are supplied and deployed, it will be challenging for Iran to maintain its current stance, necessitating a shift in its official rhetoric.
- This development should be viewed not only as a further step in Iran’s involvement in the conflict but also in the broader context of its military ambitions. Tehran has long sought Su-35 fighter jets from Moscow, though this has yet to materialise. The Russian “expert community” has even reported Iran’s interest in acquiring not just the jets but also the documentation for their production, a prospect that has unsettled Moscow. Thus, if Iran does receive these ballistic missiles, it is highly likely that Tehran will eventually secure Su-35 fighters and potentially even gain access to their production facilities.
- Russia has escalated its use of nuclear blackmail. The hostilities in the Kursk region have prompted Russia to escalate its use of nuclear blackmail in an attempt to exert pressure on Ukraine. Russian propaganda has been spreading disinformation about potential threats to the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) from Ukrainian forces. To bolster this narrative, Russia has sought to involve the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). For instance, Moscow recently claimed it had informed the IAEA about discovering missile fragments at the Kursk NPP. Additionally, Rosatom Director Alexey Likhachev took the initiative to contact IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, alleging that Ukraine’s actions pose a significant threat not only to the Kursk NPP but to the global nuclear industry as a whole. The IAEA has repeatedly stated that it is closely monitoring the situation and sees no immediate cause for alarm.
- In a similar vein, Russia has begun using the occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP as a tool for nuclear blackmail. On August 11, signs of a fire were detected at the plant, which Russia attributed to a Ukrainian drone attack, despite prompt responses from Ukrainian authorities clarifying the situation. Moscow is seeking official confirmation from the IAEA regarding the alleged “Ukrainian attack.” Given the escalating military situation in the Kursk region, it is highly likely that the Kremlin will persist in its nuclear blackmail tactics. To counteract this, Ukraine must maintain regular communication with the IAEA to mitigate the impact of Russian propaganda.
