Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Putin’s “peaceful” statements at the SCO summit, Russia’s new tools for electoral fraud, and travel bans for Russian MPs
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Russian MPs are banned from freely travelling abroad. The Russian authorities have intensified efforts to tighten control over deputies and senators in the Russian parliament. Last week, a new law was passed prohibiting members of parliament from travelling abroad without approval from their superiors. Violating this rule could result in deputies being prematurely stripped of their parliamentary powers. The Kremlin’s personal interest and direction is evident, as the bill was introduced by deputies and a senator from the ruling United Russia party and swiftly passed through three readings. Public discussions on further amendments to the law are already underway. Potential changes include prohibiting deputies and senators from owning foreign property and restricting them from leaving Russia for several years after their terms end. Additionally, there are initiatives to impose travel and study restrictions on the families of parliamentarians.
- Such decisions by the Kremlin should be viewed as a desire to control its own lawmakers. This move is actively promoted by Vyacheslav Volodin, the current speaker of the Russian lower house of parliament. Volodin, a significant political player in Russia and a former official of the United Russia party and the presidential administration, likely played a key role in the passage of this law. He has long sought to enhance his influence in Russian politics, and initiatives like this are likely to be highly valued by Putin.
- Moreover, the ostentatious lifestyles of deputies and senators have consistently generated negative public opinion in Russia. By targeting lawmakers with this media-driven initiative, the authorities likely aim to boost their own popularity. Notably, this initiative came in the form of a law; a political directive from the Kremlin, especially from Putin, would have sufficed to restrict lawmakers’ travel. This legislative approach enhances the political significance of the decision and suggests its long-term impact.
- Kremlin prepares for full transition to “e-voting”. On September 8, Russia will hold its so-called “single election day,” featuring elections at various levels, from regional heads to municipal deputies. This year’s key issue revolves around the authorities’ decision to bar Russians labelled as “foreign agents” from running for office, serving as observers, or acting as trusted representatives. This group includes opposition leaders, politicians, public figures, and citizens critical of the government. Being designated as a “foreign agent” severely limits one’s political participation. The move to restrict “foreign agents” followed months of paranoia among some Russian political figures, spurred by reports that several “foreign agents” planned to run for the Moscow City Duma. Last week, it was announced that Russian authorities are tightening control over the current elections even further. To vote in person in the Moscow City Duma elections, citizens must now submit an application in advance. Without this application, voting is limited to an electronic format that cannot be verified for falsification. This measure gives the authorities greater control over the election process and outcomes in the capital, ensuring that only approved candidates can gain seats in the Moscow City Duma. Currently, several opposition-minded deputies, some already labelled as “foreign agents,” serve in the Moscow City Duma. Although they lack the power to influence policy significantly, their presence undermines the Kremlin’s image by highlighting the existence of official political figures who oppose Putin’s policies. The introduction of mandatory electronic voting effectively nullifies the possibility of these opposition figures being re-elected to the Moscow City Duma.
- There’s a significant probability that the Kremlin is using the Moscow elections as a testing ground for technical aspects that could be implemented nationwide. This move could fundamentally alter Russia’s electoral process, rendering it a mere facade without the need for direct falsification.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Putin at the SCO Summit. “Peace talks” and contradictory statements. During the July 3-4 summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Putin participated in a series of bilateral meetings and reiterated several statements. Some of these remarks appear contradictory, marking a departure from Putin’s assertions over the past 2-3 months. One notable statement was his renewed criticism of the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government. Previously, Putin had stressed that Russia recognised the Ukrainian parliament as the sole “source of legitimacy” in Ukraine. These statements seemed to suggest Russia’s openness to peace negotiations publicly while avoiding actual engagement. Furthermore, Putin’s focus on the Verkhovna Rada may have been intended to sow seeds for potential internal political turmoil in Ukraine. At the SCO summit, however, Putin effectively reversed course, dismissing the effectiveness of appealing to the Ukrainian parliament under current conditions. This shift underscores ongoing narratives questioning the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government.
- Regarding peace negotiations, Putin openly displayed his lack of interest. Initially, he asserted the impossibility of involving mediators to end the war, specifically targeting Turkish President Erdogan, who has sought a mediating role between Ukraine and Russia.
- In the context of these negotiations, Putin, addressing SCO leaders, once again referenced the “Istanbul agreements” as the foundation for ongoing discussions. Just weeks earlier, Putin had issued an ultimatum to end the war, demanding Ukraine relinquish control of the territories in Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhya, and Kherson and abandon its NATO aspirations. This ultimatum stands in contrast to the provisions outlined in the “Istanbul agreements.”
- Putin’s meeting with Hungarian prime minister Orban. Similar narratives emerged during Putin’s discussions with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who visited Moscow shortly after his trip to Kyiv. Reports indicate that the two leaders deliberated on potential negotiations and ending the war. During their joint statement, Putin reiterated his ultimatum regarding the annexation of territories in four Ukrainian regions, underscoring the Kremlin’s clear reluctance to engage in any meaningful compromise discussions. Putin’s stance on a ceasefire further revealed his manipulative approach, as he suggested that while Ukraine was unwilling to consider a ceasefire, he himself dismissed the possibility.
- Recent developments highlight Russia’s unchanged position. The Kremlin continues to issue ultimatums, and Putin shows little inclination, or outright disinterest, in exploring avenues for compromise. It appears unlikely that Russia’s stance will shift before the U.S. presidential election. Despite efforts by various foreign leaders to seek compromise, Russia has not responded, creating an impression in the media that there is no international isolation or internal challenges within Russia.
- Thus, we confront two plausible interpretations of the Kremlin’s stance:
- Russia, ostensibly open to negotiations, is strategically proposing unattainable conditions, some of which are contradictory.
- Putin is aiming for maximalist objectives to secure crucial concessions—specifically, ending the war along the front and ensuring Ukraine remains non-aligned with NATO.
