Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Putin’s “Asian tour”, a large-scale terrorist attack in the Caucasus and new methods of mobilization in Russia
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Terrorist Attacks in the Caucasus. On June 23, two coordinated attacks carried out by local religious extremists occurred in the Russian Republic of Dagestan. The targets were two Orthodox churches, a synagogue, and a police post located in Makhachkala and Derbent. These incidents sparked widespread panic in the Russian media, echoing the atmosphere that followed the “Crocus City” shopping mall attacks. While there has been no official response or accusation, some Russian authorities, including deputies, have suggested Ukrainian and Western intelligence involvement in the attacks. However, all identified members of the terrorist group are local residents of the region, with three belonging to the same family. Furthermore, some had ties to pro-government political parties; for instance, Ali Zakarigayev, who was killed, served as the head of the local branch of A Just Russia party. Additionally, two other terrorists were identified as the sons of the head of the Sergokalinsky district. This highlights not only the issue of radical Islamism in the Caucasus but also implicates members of the regional political elite in these activities.
- The attack clearly aimed to stoke religious tensions between Islam, Christianity, and Judaism by targeting religious sites and killing a local Orthodox priest, accompanied by messages referencing the Quran. Currently, the immediate escalation of religious conflict in the region appears unlikely, pending the response of federal authorities, which remains uncertain. If Moscow decides to aggressively counter local religious narratives, it could encounter resistance from the populace.
- In a separate development, authorities have announced forthcoming evaluations of all regional leaders and their oversight of law enforcement structures. However, there are no imminent plans for widespread dismissals. The region’s volatile nature makes stable management challenging, and replacing security officials could create a partial vacuum of control over the situation.
- Mobilisation in Russia: New Methods. The Russian authorities have initiated a widespread adoption of a new strategy to enlist the population in the conflict against Ukraine. This approach involves instructing investigative bodies to propose suspects and accused individuals sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense to resolve criminal cases. Reports indicate directives from the leadership of the Investigative Committee and the Ministry of Internal Affairs to all regional offices several months ago. Initially limited to temporarily occupied territories in Ukraine, this practice now appears to have expanded nationwide across Russia.
- Moreover, in specific Russian regions, notably in Tatarstan, a novel initiative to mobilise the population for the war effort against Ukraine is being introduced. At a dedicated briefing in the Tatarstan Cabinet of Ministers focusing on alimony collection, Anvar Zakirov, head of the Federal Bailiff Service for the region, announced that individuals who sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense will have their debt collection proceedings suspended. This marks a pioneering approach where the Russian authorities are compelling citizens to join the military not only by offering release from imprisonment, closure of criminal cases, or substantial lump-sum payments.
- The implementation of these mobilisation methods underscores the Russian military’s apparent shortfall in soldiers, highlighting insufficient volunteer enlistments under current recruitment measures.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Putin’s Visit to North Korea. Putin’s recent visit to North Korea marks his first since 2000, amidst prior speculation circulating for several months. The visit, occurring amidst ongoing military exchanges between North Korea and Russia, carried a distinctly militaristic emphasis. Putin’s presence underscored his keen interest in bolstering cooperation with North Korea, particularly in augmenting supplies of weapons and ammunition.
- The visit holds significant political implications for both nations. Putin sought to project active foreign policy engagement as a “re-elected president,” aiming to portray robust collaboration with North Korea’s dictatorship to capture Western attention. During expanded format negotiations, the leaders exchanged critiques of the United States and Ukraine, alleging aggressive foreign policies and obstruction of reshaping global order aligned with the Global South’s interests. Additionally, mutual declarations of unwavering support were voiced on political and economic fronts.
- The pivotal outcome of Putin’s visit to North Korea was the signing of a strategic partnership agreement, elevating North Korea to a significant political ally of Russia. This agreement includes provisions for mutual military assistance in response to armed aggression against either signatory. While it stops short of establishing direct allied obligations, it paves the way for enhanced military cooperation, particularly in arms exchange and production technologies between Russia and North Korea. The inclusion of such a clause was justified by both parties, citing “aggressive military actions” by South Korea, the US, and Japan. Moreover, the agreement outlines joint efforts by Russia and North Korea to counteract what they perceive as the “unilateral sanctions regime imposed by the US and Western states,” which they argue is wielded as a tool of aggressive foreign policy.
- For the first time, the Russian leader publicly affirmed his commitment to expanding military cooperation with North Korea, which is expected to involve the supply of weapons from Pyongyang to Moscow. This move allows Putin to openly justify receiving aid from North Korea and address accusations regarding the use of North Korean weapons under the terms of their Strategic Partnership Agreement. With the agreement now in place, there is anticipation of a substantial increase in arms shipments from North Korea to Russia. Concurrently, Russia is likely to increase investments in North Korea’s defence industry to ensure regular and reliable deliveries of military supplies.
- Putin’s Visit to Vietnam. Immediately following his visit to North Korea, Putin embarked on another Asian tour to Vietnam, where the central theme remained focused on military affairs. Contrasting with his visit to Pyongyang, which emphasised acquiring munitions, the Kremlin’s objective in Vietnam pivoted towards offering Russian weaponry for sale. Following negotiations between the Russian president and his counterpart, To Lam, a joint statement was issued. This document underscored their mutual intent to broaden cooperation across multiple domains, prominently including defence and security. Furthermore, standard assurances regarding collaborative efforts to tackle both longstanding and emerging security threats, such as terrorism, were reiterated in the statement.
- The delegation composition during Putin’s visit to Vietnam underscores that direct military-technical cooperation wasn’t the primary focus. Unlike the officials who accompanied him to North Korea, neither the new defence minister, Belousov, nor Denis Manturov, the first deputy prime minister overseeing the military-industrial complex, were part of the delegation. Instead, the group included economic officials such as the ministers of trade, industry, and justice. Notably, Dmitry Shugayev, director of the Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, and Alexander Mikheev, CEO of Rosoboronexport, were present, reaffirming the central topic of the discussions.
- Vietnam is likely considering reinstating its purchases of Russian arms. Prior to the full-scale invasion, Moscow was Hanoi’s primary arms supplier. Reports from last year indicated Vietnam’s plans to modernize its armed forces, and this year, it’s known that the US is also in talks with Vietnam about purchasing American weapons.
