Russia continues to strengthen its influence in Africa and the Middle East as a part of its strategy amidst its war against Ukraine and its efforts to challenge the Western coalition. This was starkly evident in its manoeuvres to downplay the significance of the international peace summit in Switzerland, which took place on June 15-16. With assistance from China, Moscow successfully orchestrated the absence of numerous states from Latin America, Asia, and Africa, bolstering narratives that much of the world rejects the Western stance on the Russo-Ukrainian war.
This diplomatic initiative is underpinned by Russia’s military and political presence in key regions where it has notably strengthened its footing in recent years, such as Syria and the Sahel region (including Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger). More recently, the Russian Federation has been striving to reassert itself in Sudan, leveraging its diplomacy to garner support from influential players like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
There are simultaneous shifts in trade dynamics: faced with sanctions and isolation from the West, Russia is actively seeking new markets. According to the Federal Customs Service of the Russian Federation, Africa’s share in Russian exports saw a significant uptick in 2023, doubling from 2.5% in 2022 to nearly 5% by the end of the year. In contrast, the share of exports to the Americas macroregion declined from 3.5% to 2.9% over the same period. Specifically, Russian exports to Africa surged by 43% to reach $21.2 billion, while exports to the Americas dropped by 40% to $12.2 billion.
North Africa
In early June 2024, a squadron of Russian Navy warships, led by the Varyag missile cruiser and the Marshal Shaposhnikov frigate, engaged in bilateral PASSEX exercises with Egyptian Navy vessels near the Egyptian port of Alexandria. These exercises included joint manoeuvring drills and training in communication and inspection procedures.
Interestingly, in 2024, Russia managed to surpass Ukraine in its grain sales to Egypt, a nation of 100 million that imports 90% of its grain, nearly evenly split between the warring countries.
On June 1, 2024, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov visited Libya for the fifth time since August 2023 to meet with Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army controlling the eastern region. Libyan sources indicate the meeting focused on discussing the future framework of Russia’s military presence at facilities in eastern and southern Libya under Haftar’s control. This engagement might relate to Russia’s plans to restructure its military footprint in Libya under its ‘African Corps’ initiative.
Russian alliance in the Sahel
After the successful pro-Russian coup in Niger in August 2023, a coalition of states aligned with Russian interests has emerged, primarily aimed at countering the influence of France and the USA. The decision to form this coalition was announced by Malian junta leader Assimi Goïta on September 16 during negotiations involving a delegation from the Russian Ministry of Defense and representatives from Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Leading the Russian delegation was Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, accompanied by Niger’s Defense Minister Salifou Modi and Burkina Faso junta leader Ibrahim Traoré.
In May 2024, Russian military personnel entered an airbase in Niger’s capital, Niamey, previously occupied by approximately one thousand American troops. The US subsequently relocated most of its forces to another base in Niger amidst ongoing negotiations with the Nigerien junta demanding complete US withdrawal from the country.
In December 2023, under the oversight of Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, the African Corps was established—a military unit composed of African nationals and former members of the Wagner PMC, with plans to involve up to 20,000 individuals. Officially aimed at maintaining stability in Russia’s allied Sahel countries, it is increasingly viewed as a recruitment tool for mercenaries involved in the Ukrainian conflict.
Russia has significantly ramped up its efforts to enlist foreign mercenaries for the conflict in Ukraine. This expansion spans beyond the Sahel region into Central Africa, specifically targeting recruits from Rwanda, Burundi, Congo, and Uganda. Mercenaries are offered an initial payment of $2,000 upon signing, a guaranteed monthly salary of $2,200, medical insurance, and Russian passports for themselves and their families. The casualties and captives from these nations in Ukraine have risen accordingly. Moreover, recruitment efforts are also targeting impoverished Asian countries like Sri Lanka.
Ukraine’s response
In 2024, Kyiv has successfully targeted critical connections between Russia and the African region, specifically focusing on targets in Syria and Sudan. According to a source in Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) interviewed by the Kyiv Post, Ukrainian-backed rebels from the Khimik special unit have conducted multiple attacks on Russian military installations controlled by the Russian Armed Forces group in Syria since the beginning of the year.
As early as the spring of 2022, Sudan clandestinely supplied weapons to Ukraine. Later, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council, sought President Volodymyr Zelensky’s assistance against internal opponents—the Rapid Support Forces, supported by Russian mercenaries.
Previously a critical hub for the Wagner PMC and a source of gold extraction, Sudan has been periodically approached by Russia since 2020 for the establishment of a naval base on the Red Sea. By the end of 2023, Ukrainian special forces (numbering up to a hundred individuals) had significantly disrupted Russian mercenary infrastructure in Sudan, pushing pro-Russian forces away from the capital, Khartoum, according to published reports.
However, since spring 2024, Burhan’s policies have taken a turn. Sudan Sovereignty Council member Yasir al-Atta revealed that Russia has requested to establish a “supply point” in the Red Sea for delivering weapons and ammunition. Al-Atta also cited military cooperation with Russia, which will provide arms to Sudan. Delegations led by Malik Agar, representing both the military and government, have been dispatched to Russia.
What could explain this shift? It is likely influenced by Burhan’s key ally, Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia not only supports the military government in Khartoum but also serves as a mediator in the ongoing negotiations among Sudanese factions. The change in Riyadh’s stance follows Putin’s meeting with Prince Mohammed bin Salman in December 2023 and subsequent talks. Russia may have pledged to use its influence to dissuade Iran and Yemen’s Houthis from launching future attacks on Saudi Arabia.
Burhan also relies on Egypt. The opening of an Egyptian airbase in the spring of 2023 marked a new phase in the country’s civil conflict, which was not favoured by pro-Russian groups and, apparently, Russia itself. In recent months, Moscow’s relations with Egypt have shown signs of improvement, as mentioned earlier.
Russia employs a multifaceted approach: deploying military forces, backing coups, and exploiting local conflicts. Concurrently, it operates a sophisticated propaganda network aimed at undermining Western states. The strategic goal is evident — diminishing US and European influence while generating new sources of tension to divert attention and secure trade advantages, such as accessing uranium deposits in Niger critical for European nuclear energy. However, the West has yet to mount a robust response to Russia’s actions.
