Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Russia’s ultimatum to ‘end the war,’ Armenia’s withdrawal from the CSTO, and the completion of repressions in the Russian Ministry of Defence
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Completion of the “staff purge” of Russian generals and military officials. New appointments in the Defence Ministry. Last week marked the definitive conclusion of the “collapse of the generals,” a series of crackdowns on officials from the Defence Ministry and several Russian army generals. Many of those affected had close ties to the dismissed defence ex-minister Shoigu. Putin’s recent directives appear to signify the formal end of these purges, as nearly all deputy ministers who served under Shoigu have been removed. The new Defence Minister, Belousov, has also introduced his own team, which includes economists and officials from the Russian government.
- One of the most significant appointments is Anna Tsivileva as deputy defence minister. She is known to be Putin’s second cousin and the wife of the current energy minister. With no prior high-ranking experience, her appointment appears purely political. In the ministry, Tsivileva will be responsible for the relatively unimportant area of social and housing support for the military. It seems likely that Putin appointed her to ensure better control over the ministry and to gain a clearer understanding of its inner workings. This is the first instance of Putin placing family members in high positions.
- Another crucial appointment as deputy defence minister is Pavel Fradkov, the son of Mikhail Fradkov, former director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. Pavel Fradkov previously worked for a long time in the presidential administration and the FSB. His move to the Defence Ministry is likely a personal decision by Putin aimed at balancing Belousov’s future influence.
- Other members of the newly formed Defence Ministry team are trusted associates of Belousov. Among them is Leonid Gornin, who worked for many years in the Ministry of Finance. The economic focus of the new team of deputy ministers supports earlier analyses. Belousov’s task will be to bring more economic efficiency to the Defence Ministry, to develop Russia’s military-industrial complex more effectively, and to audit the ministry’s budget.
- Russia threatens to change its nuclear doctrine. The Kremlin continues its strategy of threatening Western countries with nuclear weapons. Recently, we saw the start of exercises preparing for the use of tactical nuclear weapons, with Belarus also participating. Last week, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Sergei Ryabkov, stated that Russia might revise its nuclear deterrence policies due to the West’s “unacceptable and escalatory” actions. When asked about specific changes, Ryabkov said the details had not yet been discussed. These statements are part of Russia’s ongoing efforts to intimidate Ukraine and Western countries, using such threats to create fear and uncertainty in the international community.
- Amid these statements, Russia and Belarus are organising a new phase of nuclear exercises. On June 11, the Russian Defence Ministry announced the start of the second phase of non-strategic nuclear drills with Belarus. Russian and Belarusian military personnel will practise joint preparation for the combat use of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Ukrainian analysts have noted that these exercises are not new, but the main difference is the current media coverage of Russia’s actions.
- Currently, it is possible that the Kremlin’s recent nuclear rhetoric is also an attempt to initiate an official dialogue with the United States. Similar moves were seen in the winter of 2023 when Putin tried to negotiate a potential “freeze” of the war through intermediary states. Russia might use this approach to project a return of its global authority. This can be viewed as an effort to regain Washington’s strategic respect through escalation. Putin’s personal desire to restore his standing among Western countries is a crucial aspect of Russian foreign policy.
- Conversely, we see NATO’s reaction to these developments. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has stated that the alliance is considering deploying more nuclear weapons in response to threats from Russia and China. The influence of China significantly affects the Kremlin’s actions. Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, Beijing has actively opposed the use of nuclear weapons, as reiterated in a recent joint Sino-Brazilian statement on resolving the conflict in Ukraine. China’s influence on Russia is considerable, making Moscow’s nuclear threats more of a public display to pressure the West and its society.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Putin Issues Ultimatum to Ukraine to end the war. Last week, Putin made a significant political statement regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war and its resolution. The dictator effectively issued an ultimatum to the Ukrainian leadership, demanding that Russia must receive four regions of Ukraine: Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhya, and Kherson, including non-occupied territories. Additionally, he insists that Ukraine must officially renounce NATO membership. Only under these conditions is Russia willing to commence negotiations to end the war.
- This ultimatum represents the first public and detailed position of the Kremlin since the invasion began in 2022. Until now, Russian rhetoric on the war’s goals was couched in populist and vague terms like “denazification and demilitarisation” of Ukraine. Now, Moscow has clearly articulated its political objective.
- Additionally, Putin and other Russian officials have asserted that they would not agree to a freeze of the war along the current front line. This statement is significant as it was made during Putin’s meeting with the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Consequently, it can be inferred that Russian diplomats will begin promoting Putin’s formula for ending the war as the Russian peace plan. However, the effectiveness of this initiative is highly questionable. The timing of Putin’s statement made just one day before the start of the peace summit in Switzerland, indicates the Kremlin’s desire to influence the international agenda.
- A crucial element of the Russian “plan” is China’s position. Beijing has not yet commented on it, unlike the results of the Swiss peace summit. It is important to note that the Chinese peace initiative is essentially based on the need to stop and freeze the war along the front line, which fundamentally differs from Putin’s publicly announced position. Understanding the extent to which this initiative is coordinated with the leadership of the PRC remains critical. If this is solely a Kremlin initiative, it undermines Beijing’s peace proposals and creates an opportunity for Ukraine to align its positions more closely with China’s.
- Armenia is preparing to withdraw from the CSTO. Armenian leader Nikol Pashinyan has expressed doubts about his country’s future in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), indicating that Armenia may leave the alliance and does not intend to return. Speaking in the Armenian parliament, he accused Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko of helping Azerbaijan prepare for the war in Karabakh and wishing for its victory. Officially, Russia has barely reacted to Pashinyan’s statements. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov merely stated that Russia would continue to engage with Armenia to clarify its position on CSTO membership. However, behind the scenes, Russia appears to be attempting to destabilize Pashinyan’s government. The current protests in Armenia are being led by pro-Russian “activists” who are pushing for the restoration of “positive” and partnership relations with Moscow.
- Armenia’s distancing from Russia comes as no surprise. Over the past year, Moscow’s influence has waned, evidenced by the reduced presence of Russian military personnel on Armenian soil and the diminished impact of Russian propaganda. Concurrently, Pashinyan has been fostering ties with Western nations. Armenia’s current membership in the CSTO restricts it from procuring Western weaponry. Exiting the alliance would enable Yerevan to sever ties with Moscow on security matters entirely. Armenia is presently in talks with France for arms purchases and seeks to elevate its relationship with the United States to a strategic partnership.
- The U.S. Imposes Sanctions on the Russian Financial Sector. The United States has imposed a new wave of sanctions on Russia, targeting over 300 entities and 33 individuals involved in supporting Moscow’s war efforts. The sanctions list includes both Russian and foreign companies, notably from nations aiding Russia in circumventing sanctions, such as China, Turkey, Kazakhstan, the United Arab Emirates, and Serbia. Key sectors affected are energy and metallurgy within Russia’s economy.
- The sanctions have particularly impacted Russia’s financial sector. Specifically targeted are entities facilitating dollar transactions on the Russian currency market: the Moscow Exchange, the National Clearing Center (NCC), and the National Settlement Depository. This move aims to isolate Russia from the dollar system, dealing a significant blow to its trade activities as well.
