Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Putin threatens to supply weapons to regions ‘sensitive’ for the West, acknowledging Russia’s economic issues and ongoing political repressions.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Resignation of the Secretary of the United Russia Party Andrei Turchak. Andrei Turchak, a prominent Russian politician and high-ranking official, has been shifted from his role as general secretary of the ruling United Russia party to the governorship of the Altai Republic. Turchak has led the party since 2017. This transfer essentially amounts to a dismissal and possibly the end of his high-profile political career. Interestingly, Putin informed Turchak of his new appointment via an online conversation rather than a face-to-face meeting, which is usually broadcast to the public. In contrast, Putin typically meets in person with other appointees and new governors to show his approval of their candidacy. This public dismissal underscores Putin’s decision to remove Turchak.
- The most likely reason for Turchak’s dismissal is his role as head of a special war commission set up by Putin. Turchak was responsible for overseeing this commission, which prepared reports on the situation at the front for the president. As a result, the former United Russia secretary, along with other military officials and generals, has been subjected to the ongoing repression that began a month ago. It seems Putin is looking for ‘culprits’ for the army’s lack of efficiency, making Turchak’s political future look bleak. For the Russian dictator, the current war has become almost the sole justification for Russia’s existence. The drive to build his own ideology has led to the singular goal of defeating Ukraine at any cost. In this context, Turchak’s failure to manage the situation on the front line makes him one of those responsible for the army’s shortcomings in Putin’s eyes.
- Russia admits its economy is “overheated” and operating at maximum industrial capacity. Herman Gref, the CEO of Sberbank, announced during his speech to the Federation Council (the upper house of parliament) that the Russian economy is currently “overheated.” He explained that the economy is growing at a rate beyond its actual capacity. This situation is largely due to the war, with Russia’s primary industrial capacity operating at a record 84%. According to Gref, it is impossible to surpass this threshold.
- Explaining his position at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Gref noted that the current model of economic growth in Russia is unsustainable and will soon be exhausted. He pointed out that significant budget resources are being funnelled into the consumer market without any corresponding increase in goods or labour production, leading to rising prices and declining labour productivity. The two main budgetary issues are the enormous salaries and payments to Russian military personnel and contractors, who receive millions of rubles upon signing contracts, with even larger payouts in case of death. This means the population is receiving income levels that are not supported by production.
- The second problem is the high level of government contracts. As mentioned earlier, Russia’s industrial complex operates at maximum capacity, generating high wages for workers without corresponding economic demand. If these funds were suddenly cut off, it would reveal that the Russian economy, strained by the war, cannot develop beyond the military-industrial complex.
- For Ukraine, this clearly shows that the Kremlin cannot end the war, either politically or economically. Consequently, Moscow’s claims of readiness for negotiations and peace are not reflective of reality.
- Russian losses and mobilisation. During the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Putin met with foreign journalists, marking his first such ‘dialogue’ since the full-scale invasion began. He made several statements, notably addressing potential Russian losses in the war. Putin claimed that the Russian army was losing troops at a rate of 1 to 5 compared to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and later asserted that Ukraine was losing 50,000 soldiers a month. By his numbers, this implies the Russian army is losing 10,000 soldiers monthly. If accurate, Russia will eventually need to conduct another wave of mobilisation. Putin commented that the government does not plan to conduct a mobilisation due to a lack of necessity, a claim Russian officials have echoed in recent months. However, in 2022, high-ranking Russian officials denied the need for mobilisation 14 times in the seven months following the full-scale invasion, only to announce it in September 2022.
- We’re now in a situation where the Russian army requires additional forces and rotations. According to a report by the Financial Times, quoting sources close to the Russian military leadership, a new wave of mobilisation will likely be necessary from late 2024 to early 2025. Without it, future large-scale military operations will be unfeasible. Recently, there have been reports that since May, the Russian authorities have been coercively deploying those who previously refused mobilisation to the front lines, suggesting the inevitability of a second wave of mobilisation in Russia.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Putin’s threat of weapons supply to regions which are ‘sensitive’ for the West. During his discussion with foreign media representatives, Putin issued a warning to Western nations, suggesting the potential supply of long-range weapons to sensitive regions to target their facilities. This was framed as Russia’s ‘response’ to Ukraine’s use of Western weapons against targets inside Russia. At this stage, such rhetoric shouldn’t be viewed as highly threatening. It’s likely another instance of Kremlin posturing aimed at exerting pressure on Western countries, particularly those in Europe. Throughout the conflict, Russian officials have frequently threatened to attack Western weapons convoys, yet they’ve never followed through, much like the threats of nuclear escalation. Regarding the supply of arms to unspecified ‘sensitive’ regions, it’s understood that most of Russia’s weaponry is being deployed in the war against Ukraine. Since the full-scale invasion, Russian military exports have plummeted by 53%, and this figure may have decreased further by now. Thus, there isn’t a systemic capacity to supply specific weapons to other regions; it’s more likely to be isolated incidents. Vladimir Dzhabarov, the first deputy chairman of the Federation Council’s Committee on International Affairs, pointed to the Houthis in Yemen, Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea, and Iran as examples of the geographic extent of Russian intimidation. Among these, the Houthis and Iran, with the potential to supply Russian weapons to their proxies in the Middle East, including Iranian-backed proxies in Iraq, pose the most significant threat to Western nations.
- Some Russian politicians have even gone as far as to threaten to supply weapons to radical and separatist movements within Western countries themselves. However, the practical feasibility of such threats appears dubious.
