Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Dyumin appointed as Secretary of the State Council, the Way Home movement declared a foreign agent, new talks of a nuclear strike, issues with ‘Power of Siberia-2’.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Alexei Dyumin was appointed as Secretary of the State Council. Alexei Dyumin, a Russian official and presidential aide who is quite close to Putin, has received another appointment. He has been appointed Secretary of the State Council, a very specific Russian government institution. It does not perform specific functions in day-to-day activities, and its functionality is quite general: it provides consultations on a number of political, economic and public issues. During the constitutional changes in 2020, it was widely believed that Putin would assume this position after the long-awaited transition of power. The lack of a detailed definition of the State Council’s functions makes it possible to interpret how this institution is used politically. Moreover, today, it has practically no functions. The last time the Council of State was used in Russia was during the COVID-19 pandemic. It served as a federal advisory body that dealt with the issue of interregional cooperation. At the same time, the Council of State has a high political potential. Due to the downgrading of the Security Council after Nikolai Patrushev’s move to the post of presidential aide and his replacement by the dismissed Shoigu, this institution may become the most important federal consultative body in Russia. This will depend on Putin’s will and Dyumin’s effectiveness.
- The reason Putin appointed Dyumin to the position of Secretary of the State Council is most likely to prepare his close aide for a future political career at the federal level. At present, Dyumin does not have much experience in the system of government bureaucracy. Holding both the position of presidential aide for cooperation with the Russian military-industrial complex (effectively serving as a shadow defence minister) and that of State Council secretary allows Dyumin to address this lack of experience.
- The Way Home movement, comprised of wives of mobilised soldiers, has been declared a foreign agent. The Russian Ministry of Justice has announced that the organisation of wives of mobilised Russians ‘Way Home’ has been declared a “foreign agent”. Consequently, the movement’s operations have been severely restricted, and any potential collaboration with political forces has been eliminated. The Way Home is known for organising various protests and events aimed at drawing attention to the struggles of mobilised Russians. The group has positioned itself as a non-political organisation, yet it has effectively created a public perception as a movement opposed to Russian mobilisation and the war. This opposition is seen as a political threat by the Kremlin, which cannot tolerate such a narrative. Moreover, the Russian Research and Analysis Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs recently published a report highlighting the Way Home movement, suggesting that it could have an impact on the rise of crime in Russia. The report also mentioned the “acute conflict situation in Ukraine,” Navalny’s death, and the return of former prisoners of war. This decision once again underscores the seriousness with which the Russian bureaucratic apparatus views the issue of mobilised Russians.
- Russia is once again talking about a nuclear strike. In recent Russian political discussions, the topic of whether to use nuclear weapons for a demonstration strike and to intimidate Ukraine and Western countries has come up again. This was brought up by political scientist Dmitry Suslov, deputy director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the Higher School of Economics. He suggested that Russian authorities should reinforce their deterrence policy by conducting a public nuclear explosion on neutral or Russian territory in response to the US and certain European countries supporting Ukraine’s use of Western weapons to attack Russian territory. Suslov pointed out that these states no longer fear Russian threats and warnings about Russia’s willingness to use nuclear weapons in a conflict with NATO. Therefore, he believes that such an explosion and the resulting ‘mushroom cloud’ would have a significant political and psychological impact, instilling fear in the West once again.
- It’s important to note that Suslov’s immediate superior is Sergei Karganov, a well-known Russian figure who is one of the founders of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy. This expert centre has brought together a number of Russian politicians, diplomats, and analysts. Approximately a year ago, Karganov himself advocated for a pre-emptive nuclear strike on Europe and openly initiated a discussion on this topic within the expert community. Karganov is also a member of the Scientific Council of the Security Council. There have been reports in some Russian media that suggest Nikolai Patrushev values his opinion. Therefore, Suslov’s statement may be seen as an extension of this line of nuclear threats. In reality, it is likely that such messages are directed at foreign embassies that monitor the Russian information space.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Issues surrounding the Russian gas pipeline Power of Siberia-2. Russia is facing significant problems with the implementation of the Power of Siberia-2 gas transportation system project. It is intended to connect the Russian gas fields of Yamal and Western Siberia with China via Mongolia. This project has been planned for several years, and negotiations between the Russian and Chinese sides are still ongoing. China’s position remains a key issue. The pipeline capacity should be 50 billion cubic metres of gas per year. But Beijing wants to buy only a small fraction of that. In fact, according to a recent report in the Financial Times, the Chinese side wants to buy gas at a price close to the market price in Russia, which is kept low by government subsidies. Another obstacle is that Beijing does not want to finance the project and is proposing that Moscow build it on its own. The Kremlin and Gazprom are confronted with its absolute unprofitability. The Ukrainian Prism analysed the recent visit of Putin and the Russian delegation to China and emphasised the high probability that one of the main topics of negotiations was the issue of this gas transportation project. The Financial Times has confirmed this information.
- Gazprom is facing the challenge of having to accept the demands of China. This is because Russia doesn’t have any other viable market options. The conflict in Ukraine resulted in Russia losing over 120 billion cubic meters of gas sales to Europe. Russia heavily relies on pipelines for gas transportation, as it lacks access to liquefied natural gas (LNG) technology, and the Arctic LNG-2 project is effectively closed due to sanctions. This leaves China as their only feasible focus.
- Additionally, Ukrainian Prism’s analysis of the low likelihood of resolving the issue of payments by Russian clients in Chinese banks has been confirmed. The Moscow Times, which interviewed managers of companies specialising in payments, reported that the situation has only worsened since the meeting between Putin and Xi Jinping.
- Putin continues talking about the legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities. While visiting Uzbekistan, Putin stated that the Ukrainian parliament and its speaker are the only legitimate authorities in Ukraine. This echoes a similar statement he made during his visit to Belarus in Minsk. On that occasion, the Russian leader declared that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was no longer legitimate. It is unclear whether the Kremlin has completely ruled out the possibility of future negotiations with the Ukrainian authorities. Following his statement, Putin reiterated that the legitimacy of the government in Ukraine should be determined by its political and legal system, echoing what he said after his meeting with Xi Jinping in China.
- At present, we should interpret these outspoken declarations as public rhetoric intended to create a propaganda image and potentially influence public opinion in Ukraine and its political elite. The Kremlin is likely also attempting to signal the Ukrainian parliament and its members about the potential for impeaching Volodymyr Zelenskyy and transferring control to its speaker. However, it’s important to note that such a scenario is implausible. Therefore, we do not anticipate significant changes in Russia’s current strategy, which is focused on pushing for “negotiations” and freezing the war.
