Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: A crackdown on the Russian military leadership, pretending to engage in “ceasefire negotiations”, and Putin’s visit to Belarus.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- The start of a ‘historic’ purge against Russia’s military command and generals. Russia has begun a massive crackdown on high-ranking military officials. Over the past month, seven generals and officials from the Ministry of Defense have already been removed from their positions. This signals a de facto transfer of power and a strengthening of the security agencies, particularly the FSB. The resignation of Shoigu has created a situation where many top military officials and generals within the Russian authorities no longer have protection. Such events are unprecedented in recent Russian history. These “repressions” have recently extended to several other officials as well.
- Yuri Kuznetsov, the head of the Main Personnel Department of the Defense Ministry, and another member of Shoigu’s team, Timur Ivanov, have been accused of accepting large bribes.
- Vadim Shamarin, the Head of the Main Communications Department of the Defense Ministry and Deputy Chief of the General Staff has been accused of bribery. Shamarin’s arrest, as Gerasimov’s deputy, represents a direct attack on military officers. Although Gerasimov has not lost his position amidst the recent governmental changes, unlike Shoigu, the ongoing actions against military officials and generals indicate that he can no longer protect his subordinates. It is likely only a matter of time before Gerasimov is replaced, which would cause a temporary paralysis of the Russian army.
- Vladimir Vertelyetsky is the head of the defence procurement department and is facing accusations of abuse of power.
- Ivan Popov is a well-known major general and former commander of the 58th Army, highly regarded in the Russian military community. He gained attention in 2023 for openly clashing with military leadership by reporting on the challenging situation at the front and highlighting several issues. As a result, he was dismissed from his position. He is currently facing accusations of large-scale fraud. Popov’s arrest indicates that not only ministers but also generals are being targeted.
- Sukhrab Akhmedov is a Lieutenant General and Commander of the 20th Army. Russian military correspondents and the media outlet RBK announced that he has been relieved of his duties. He gained notoriety in June 2023 when he was accused of negligence after he ordered a large number of soldiers to line up and wait for two hours for his arrival, leaving them vulnerable to an attack by Ukrainian troops.
- In the Russian media landscape, there is a narrative being promoted that the arrests of military officers will continue. Today, the FSB, which carries out and supervises these arrests, is once again becoming the main authority. The reason for these arrests was actually the failure of the Russian army during the war. After losing their main patrons in the form of Shoigu and Geramisov, military commanders no longer have any protection.
- Major tax reform: Kremlin seeks additional funds for its war. A major tax reform is currently being discussed in Russia following an initiative proposed by Putin during his federal address. The reform aims to introduce a new tax system for individuals with high incomes and is being promoted in Russia’s pro-government media as “fair”. The proposed changes indicate that the tax on personal income, which is the main tax for all citizens, will be increased from the current 13%. According to reports from Bloomberg, the tax for Russians earning more than 1 million rubles a year will increase to 15%, and for those earning more than 5 million a year, it will rise to 20%. This is expected to generate more revenue for the government from businesses, corporations (whose tax may also increase from 20 to 25%), and the average Russian. It is speculated that the additional revenue will be used to finance the war and support the budget. The draft of the tax reform is designed in a way that aims not to burden the majority of Russians with low incomes, possibly taking into account the negative reaction to the “pension” reform.
- Russia begins nuclear drills. Russia has officially begun the nuclear drills that were announced in early May. The Russian Defence Ministry released a video showing troops receiving ammunition for the Iskander tactical missile system and covertly moving into the area to prepare for a missile launch. The intense media attention to these exercises demonstrates the Kremlin’s desire to “scare” Western countries, as the Russian side has actually stated. As early as May 6, Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said that the nuclear drills were a response to “provocative statements and threats by Western leaders.” In fact, there is nothing out of the ordinary about these exercises; they are conducted on a regular basis. The only difference is the high level of media visibility we are currently witnessing.
Foreign policy cases:
- Russia continues promoting its “ceasefire” offer in the format of a ‘war freeze’. The Kremlin is actively promoting its strategy for organising a “ceasefire”. According to a recent article by Reuters, citing sources among high-ranking Russian political elites, Putin is reportedly willing to halt the war by initiating ceasefire negotiations that would solidify the current front lines of both sides. The article also emphasises that Putin is prepared to continue the war. This publication closely resembles similar ones from the winter of 2023-2024, when Putin attempted to engage the United States through intermediaries with a proposal to freeze the war at the front lines. At that time, the Americans declined to discuss the issue without involving Ukraine.
- An important aspect of Russia’s strategy is the avoidance of discussing a “peace treaty” and instead focusing on freezing the war and implementing a “permanent ceasefire.” This approach allows Putin to reorganize the army safely. The appointment of economist Andrei Belousov as Defense Minister suggests that Putin is preparing for an extended conflict, as evidenced by the removal of “ineffective” generals and military officials.
- These actions are targeted at Western leaders to exert political pressure on the Ukrainian authorities. The Kremlin aims to potentially gain a stronger position in future negotiations through these measures. Putin’s recent references to the “Istanbul agreements” as the basis for any negotiations further support this strategy.
- Putin’s visit to Belarus: statements about peace negotiations, Zelenskyy’s illegitimacy, and nuclear threats. After his first visit to China since his inauguration, Putin went to Belarus to meet with Lukashenko. The true purpose of the visit was not publicly disclosed and mainly focused on economic support and security issues. The officials accompanying Putin hint at the topics of discussion. For instance, the new Russian Defence Minister, Alexei Belousov, who replaced Sergei Shoigu, met with his Belarusian counterpart, Viktor Khrenin, in Minsk. This visit was seen as an opportunity to align strategies with Belarus. It is also likely that there will be an increase in orders from Belarusian defence enterprises to support the Russian Army. Additionally, Alexei Likhachev, the general director of Rosatom, visited Belarus. Considering Lukashenko’s recent expression of interest in building a second nuclear power plant, Likhachev’s visit indicates ongoing negotiations on this matter. Therefore, the main discussion topics were war, nuclear exercises, and the economy.
- In the public space, the focal point of Putin’s visit was his statements during the press conference. He declared that Russia is prepared for negotiations and reiterated the established Russian position of initiating a dialogue based on the “Istanbul agreements” and taking into consideration “realities on the ground”. This indicates that Putin is willing to revert to the initial months of the war, during which Russia aimed to legally restrict Ukraine’s sovereignty, the size of its military forces, and its ability to join NATO. As for the second stance, it pertains to Russia maintaining control over the territories it has already seized. The Kremlin must acknowledge the futility of such a maximalist position, so its intent can only be comprehended through the lens of striving to achieve a so-called “ceasefire” that Russian troops can exploit to swiftly and securely rebuild the army, as well as fortify their positions in the already occupied territories. Russia has been actively promoting this final aspect since the autumn of 2023.
- Putin made a statement about the “illegitimacy” of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyi. After his official visit to China on May 17, Putin responded to this question by stating that it is up to the Ukrainian legal system to “determine this question.” It seems unlikely that Putin’s position has changed dramatically after his meeting with Xi Jinping, especially given his desire to “resume peace talks.” Currently, this statement should be seen as political pressure on the West and Ukraine, as well as an attempt to discredit the upcoming peace summit in Switzerland.
- The leaders did not extensively discuss the recent nuclear drills announced by Russia and joined by Belarus. Lukashenko mentioned that the last meeting was more focused on economic cooperation.
