Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Results of Putin’s visit to China, the demise of Shoigu’s team, and the new presidential aides, Patrushev and Dyumin.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Changes in the presidential administration: new positions of Patrushev and Dyumin. All the government changes and appointments in Russia have been completed. As analysed by Ukrainian Prism, Nikolai Patrushev, an unofficial leader of the Russian siloviki and one of the most powerful politicians, was appointed to the presidential administration as Putin’s aide. Officially, the former head of the Security Council will be in charge of shipbuilding. In the Russian political space, this promotion was seen as the end of Patrushev’s political career. First of all, it should be understood that he is too authoritative a person among the top officials. Unlike Shoigu, who has never been a member of the so-called siloviki, the law enforcement forces, Patrushev has long been perceived as almost the second man in Russia. The main consequence of his authority was that he was able to conduct the most open and serious negotiations with foreign representatives. In fact, Patrushev has always been one of the few Russian politicians who formed Putin’s inner circle and were aware of all his plans. This is confirmed by earlier reports in the Western media, in which Patrushev was named as one of the architects of the idea of starting a war against Ukraine, along with Putin’s friend and leader of a powerful political clan, Yuri Kovalchuk. All these facts suggest that it is too early to write off Nikolai Patrushev.
- In addition to Patrushev, another Russian politician has been appointed as an aide to the president. This is Alexei Dyumin, a former personal bodyguard of Putin, who joined the presidential administration after serving as governor of the Tula region. Ukrainian Prism recently analysed his personal meeting with Putin and wrote that it signifies a significant future promotion for Dyumin. As a presidential aide, he will be responsible for overseeing the defence industry and sports. In fact, he can be called Russia’s new shadow defence minister, who will be in direct and almost constant contact with Putin. It is worth noting that before the full-scale invasion, Dyumin was perceived as one of the potential successors of the Russian dictator. His return to the federal level and his direct subordination to the president in such a high position make him an important figure with a potentially high political future once again.
- The rise of Russia’s ‘political princes’, Boris Kovalchuk and Dmitry Patrushev. Another significant change in the Russian political landscape was the appointment of the sons of two of Putin’s close associates to significant government positions. Dmitry Patrushev, son of Nikolai Patrushev, is slated to become deputy prime minister, while Boris Kovalchuk, son of Yuri Kovalchuk, widely regarded as Putin’s closest ally, will assume leadership of the Russian Audit Chamber. These appointments signal the enduring influence of the Patrushevs within Putin’s inner circle. Boris Kovalchuk stands as another notable figure. In March, he was appointed as deputy head of the presidential control department after spending 15 years at the helm of Inter Rao, a major electricity distribution company with assets across Russia and neighbouring countries. His new role carries significant weight, particularly as the position of head of the Accounting Chamber has remained vacant since November 2022. Putin’s reluctance to fill this position reflects concerns over potentially strengthening a particular political faction. Consequently, the Kovalchuks, who already exert considerable influence through ownership of Russia’s entire propaganda media conglomerate and Rossiya Bank, are poised to gain control over the audit of the Russian budget.
- The demise of Shoigu’s team – new arrests and resignations in the Ministry of Defence. After the resignation of former Defence Minister Shoigu and his potential ‘political retirement’ to the Security Council, significant changes within the Defence Ministry have commenced. Last week, reports emerged of the arrest of Yury Kuznetsov, the head of the Main Personnel Department of the Defence Ministry, marking the second arrest of a ministry official following Timur Ivanov. Moreover, several members of Shoigu’s team may be departing from their positions. Russian media disclosed that Ruslan Tsalikov, Shoigu’s deputy, had submitted a letter of resignation. It is noteworthy that Tsalikov has already been questioned in the Ivanov case, suggesting he lacks protection. Similar reports surfaced regarding Tatyana Shevtsova and Alexei Krivoruchko, also deputy ministers under Shoigu. Consequently, we are witnessing the de facto dismantling of Shoigu’s entire team. This further signifies that the political career of the former defence minister may be reaching its conclusion.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- The results of Putin’s visit to China. Putin made his first official foreign visit since his ‘re-election’ as president, with China being the chosen destination—a predictable choice. Russia’s increasing reliance on China, particularly in the high-tech sector and China’s significant purchase of Russian oil and gas resources underscores the rationale behind this decision. Additionally, the Kremlin grapples with the challenge of current barriers hindering cooperation between Chinese banks and Russian clients. Following U.S. warnings of secondary sanctions against entities aiding Russia in circumventing sanctions, Russian businessmen have encountered substantial difficulties. The significance of Putin’s visit is evident in the composition of the accompanying delegation. Notably, the Kremlin brought along a substantial contingent of Russian officials, encompassing nearly the entire Russian nomenclature. Prime Minister Mishustin was the sole member of the Russian government absent from the delegation. Representatives spanned from security officials to the financial sector, facilitating extensive engagements between Russian and Chinese counterparts alongside the bilateral talks between Putin and Xi Jinping.
- The main focus of the Russian delegation’s visit centred on the meeting between the two leaders, culminating in the issuance of a joint statement. Notably, such an occurrence hadn’t taken place since shortly before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The statement, however, underscored that the Kremlin gained little to nothing in economic or financial terms. It contained the customary rhetoric about bolstering cooperation, alongside familiar criticisms of the United States and its policies—sanctions, efforts to ‘alter the strategic balance of power,’ and the adverse effects of NATO. Putin’s remarks were notably optimistic, tinged with a hint of deference, particularly in his assertion of an enduring fraternal bond between Russians and Chinese. An ongoing concern pertains to the interaction between Russian clients and Chinese banks, an issue that remains unresolved. Xi Jinping merely suggested the establishment of an interdepartmental commission to address this matter.
- Similar considerations apply to Russia’s longstanding strategy involving the development of the North Sea route, wherein attempts were made once again to engage China. Representatives of the Russian government announced positive collaborative endeavours, including a joint aircraft project, a collaborative lunar base initiative, and proposals for increased investments in Russian enterprises.
- The status of China’s potential involvement in the forthcoming peace conference scheduled for June in Switzerland remains uncertain. It’s widely speculated that Putin may have attempted to dissuade Xi Jinping from attending. Regarding China’s stance on Russia’s conflict with Ukraine, there appears to be no alteration in their position.
- One of the most pressing and pivotal matters discussed at the meeting was the fate of the Power of Siberia 2 project—a gas pipeline that the Kremlin has long sought to advance. Throughout, the Chinese delegation has remained steadfast in their private dismissal of discussions regarding gas prices. With the European market, historically Russia’s primary customer, now largely inaccessible, Putin faces an imminent need to pivot towards the East. However, the issue surrounding the gas pipeline saw no resolution following his visit. In a bid to garner support for the project, Putin floated the idea of constructing an oil pipeline alongside the proposed route of Power of Siberia-2. This move can be interpreted as an endeavour to muster at least some rationale for commencing construction on the gas pipeline.
