Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Russia escalates its “nuclear” rhetoric, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is put on Russia’s wanted list, and Putin meets with Alexei Dyumin, his potential successor
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Kremlin bans Russian foreign agents from running for office. The Russian government, via the State Duma, has proposed amendments to the law on “foreign agents,” essentially targeting politicians and activists critical of the regime. Under these amendments, individuals designated as foreign agents would be barred from running as candidates in any elections. This issue came to the forefront in early April when the pro-government faction “A Just Russia for Truth” presented a proposal to the State Duma following reports of potential participation by several dozen foreign agents in upcoming local elections to the Moscow State Duma. However, the bill was sent back for revision. Despite this setback, the authorities have decided to proceed with these changes, though the rationale behind such drastic measures remains unclear. Primarily, these amendments conflict with the Russian Constitution, which prohibits the election of citizens deemed incompetent by a court or those incarcerated. Moreover, maintaining the appearance of legitimacy in all processes is crucial for the Russian authorities’ domestic standing. Presently, it appears that the Kremlin has found a relatively straightforward method to exert control over candidates at every level, from local representatives to members of the State Duma. In essence, the Russian authorities possess the most potent means of influencing electoral processes throughout Putin’s tenure.
- Putin met with Alexei Dyumin, who was named as a possible successor. Last week, the Russian political community was abuzz with a discussion of Putin’s meeting with Alexei Dyumin, the current governor of the Tula region and one of those previously named as a potential successor to the Russian dictator. Dyumin developed a good relationship with Putin while working as a presidential security officer and aide. He was also one of the key people involved in the annexation of Crimea and the transportation of Yanukovych to Russia. Dyumin has been the governor of the Tula region since 2016, but his authority among Russian politicians is actually quite high. At one point, he was called a possible successor to Putin, although with the start of the full-scale invasion, this issue is no longer so relevant.
- There are several reasons for the importance of his current meeting with Putin. Since Dyumin will serve as governor until 2026, it is unlikely that the meeting was organised purely to discuss regional issues or plans for work in the Tula region, especially a few days before the presidential inauguration. So, the first and most important factor is the forthcoming change of power in the Russian government. There is a real possibility that Dyumin will be promoted in the near future. It should be remembered that in December 2015, he held the position of the arrested Deputy Defence Minister Timur Ivanov, a position in which Dyumin worked for only a month, probably because he was not able to cooperate with Shoigu’s team effectively. So, the possibility of his return to this position is quite high. In addition, his transfer is possible directly to the Russian government, which also expects local changes.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Russia resumes threats and organises ‘nuclear’ exercises. Russia has ramped up its aggressive rhetoric surrounding nuclear weapons. The Russian Ministry of Defence has officially declared the initiation of preparations for exercises aimed at “enhancing the readiness of non-strategic nuclear forces for combat missions.” Essentially, this signals a return to threats of tactical nuclear weapon use. Shortly thereafter, the Kremlin, via Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov, clarified that this move was a “response” to recent statements by French President Macron regarding the potential deployment of French forces in Ukraine. Peskov also cited British Foreign Secretary David Cameron’s remarks on the possibility of Ukrainian armed forces utilizing British weaponry on Russian soil as contributing to the escalation of Russian rhetoric. However, history shows that previous Russian threats, such as targeting “arms convoys” and statements by political leaders, have not resulted in tangible consequences. The same applies to nuclear escalation. In the past two years, Russia has indeed broached the topic of employing tactical nuclear weapons in the aftermath of the annexation of four Ukrainian regions amid setbacks in the Kharkiv region. However, this escalation was primarily political, aiming to bolster the Kremlin’s stance on initiating “negotiations” on Russia’s terms. This move was driven by the imperative to impose a ceasefire, a paramount objective for Russian authorities, facilitating swift and seamless preparation of their own military for continued warfare.
- There has been a recent increase in Russian nuclear threats, which may be linked to Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s current visit to Europe. It’s likely that China is trying to use Russia’s nuclear rhetoric to push for negotiations on its own terms. This emphasises Russia’s stance and may be an attempt to impose its conditions for any future talks.
- Tucker Carlson interviews Alexander Dugin. The controversial American journalist Tucker Carlson, who earlier interviewed Putin in January 2024, has released a new interview. This time, his guest was Alexander Dugin, a Russian ‘philosopher,’ political analyst, and one of the leading proponents of Ruscism ideology. Dugin shared his views on the perceived failure of liberalism, the ominous influence of globalists, conservatism, and traditional values with Carlson. Their entire conversation seemed geared towards promoting Russian foreign policy narratives to a Western audience. Interestingly, it appears that this interview was arranged somewhat spontaneously. Following the announcement of Carlson’s interview with Putin, many analysts anticipated the Russian leader using the American journalist’s platform to propagate his ideas to the audience of the Republican Party and right-wing political factions in Europe. However, Putin chose to focus solely on discussing the history of Ukraine, its purported ‘inability’ to exist, and expressing his grievances towards the entire Western world, which he felt had continually “deceived” him. It was evident that Carlson himself had anticipated a different rhetoric from the dictator. Dugin’s discourse echoed this sentiment. It’s plausible that the Russian propaganda apparatus swiftly adjusted its strategy, opting to utilise Carlson to disseminate the desired ideas among the American audience. However, it’s apparent now that this attempt fell short. The interview with Dugin failed to gain significant traction and attracted few views, which is relatively low considering Carlson’s media influence.
- Russia has put several Ukrainian politicians on its ‘wanted’ list, including Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Russia has added several Ukrainian politicians to its wanted list, including Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, former President Petro Poroshenko, former NSDC Secretary Oleksiy Danilov, former Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman, former Interior Minister Arsen Avakov, and former Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Ruslan Khomchak. The ramifications of this move are challenging to assess, given the brief time elapsed since its occurrence.
- On one hand, this decision aligns directly with Russia’s public rhetoric, which has consistently rejected the legitimacy of any Ukrainian government since 2014. The Kremlin habitually attributes blame to Ukrainian leaders for everything from instigating the conflict in eastern Ukraine to the full-scale invasion in 2022. Simultaneously, Russia hints at the possibility of negotiations, citing the so-called “Istanbul agreements” purportedly formulated during early negotiations between Ukrainian and Russian representatives at the onset of the conflict. In this context, the Kremlin hasn’t explicitly questioned the legitimacy of the Ukrainian government. However, some Russian pundits have already begun to propagate the narrative that Russia’s move signifies a refusal to engage in future negotiations with Ukrainian authorities.
- At this juncture, it remains uncertain whether this decision merely reflects public rhetoric or signals a genuine refusal by the Kremlin to engage in negotiations with the current Ukrainian government. The answer to this question hinges on the Kremlin’s statements following May 20, the formal end of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s term. Russia is advancing a propaganda narrative suggesting that the current president will lose legitimacy after this date. If the Kremlin promptly announces its intention to cease negotiations with Zelenskyy post-May 20, it would serve as confirmation of this stance.
