Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Russian teens working at Tatarstan’s military enterprises, the Kremlin’s potential destabilization of Moldova, and the transfer of Russian Nornickel’s facilities to China
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Tatarstan Authorities allow 14-year-olds to work at the region’s defence enterprises. In Tatarstan, there’s news of a new initiative from the regional government aimed at boosting youth employment. According to reports from the pro-government Kommersant newspaper, teenagers between the ages of 14 and 18 will now have the opportunity to work part-time at defence enterprises. The rationale behind this move, as explained by the local government, stems from a trend where Russian teenagers prioritise pursuing secondary and higher education over entering the workforce directly. Additionally, there’s a pressing need for skilled workers in Tatarstan, compounded by low birth rates, which have adversely affected the region’s defence industry. This initiative is seen as part of Russia’s broader efforts to ramp up weapons production for its military. Notably, this isn’t the first time Tatarstan has explored such measures. Back in 2023, there was a similar attempt to amend legislation, allowing teenagers as young as 16 to work in hazardous environments within the region. However, this proposal faced significant public opposition and was ultimately shelved. Today, the context has shifted, with local authorities feeling pressured to comply with federal directives. Understanding the decisions made by the Tatarstan government in this light is crucial.
- This move poses a significant risk for potential new “workers.” In early April, we witnessed the first attack by Ukrainian drones on a defence enterprise in Tatarstan, specifically a factory in Elabuga responsible for producing Shahed kamikaze attack drones. It’s worth noting that students from the local polytechnic institute were among those working there. Essentially, by allowing teenagers to work at defence enterprises, the Russian authorities are exposing their youth to direct threats. Moreover, there’s a concern that educational institutions in the region might interpret the government’s decision as a mandate, potentially coercing teenagers into working for defence enterprises against their will. This aligns with the broader workings of the Russian bureaucratic system.
- Chechen minister detained by Dagestan police. Last week, another incident spotlighted the ongoing tension between Kadyrov and the authorities in Dagestan, Russia. This longstanding feud primarily revolves around the Chechen leaders’ ambition to exert control over specific territories in Dagestan. The recent episode unfolded when Dagestan police detained Alikhan Tsakaev, head of the Chechen department of the Ministry of Emergency Situations, at the border between the two regions. Reports indicate that Tsakaev, allegedly intoxicated, failed to comply with patrol services’ requests to stop his vehicle and displayed inappropriate behaviour. Consequently, police forcibly removed him from the car and placed him under arrest. Video footage capturing the incident circulated widely across Russian media channels, sparking swift and vocal condemnation from Kadyrov.
- Labelling the event as a provocation, Kadyrov criticised Dagestan’s law enforcement officers and hinted at potential repercussions. Some reports suggested that following Tsakaev’s arrest, a convoy of Chechen vehicles arrived at the border crossing, leading to a confrontation. However, there’s no official confirmation of this claim. Subsequently, Dagestan’s governor, Sergei Melikov, stepped in to defend the actions of the region’s police officers. Federal authorities intervened in the escalating dispute, with the Main Directorate of the Russian Interior Ministry siding with Dagestan’s law enforcement agencies and affirming Tsakaev’s misconduct.
- Understanding Kadyrov’s reaction requires considering his ongoing conflict with Dagestan’s elites and his internal power dynamics as the Chechen leader. In this context, the incident is perceived as a direct challenge to Kadyrov, with Minister Tsakaev being seen as his representative. Failure to address such a confrontation could undermine Kadyrov’s authority. Consequently, we might anticipate a response from him, possibly in the form of a provocation targeting a Dagestan law enforcement official or the authorities.
- Russian law enforcement authorities are now able to access the medical records of Russian citizens. According to the pro-government Vedomosti newspaper, Russian law enforcement agencies are set to gain direct access to citizens’ medical data, as the government has greenlighted a bill to this effect. Currently, obtaining such information requires a court order, but this requirement will be eliminated once the law is passed. Officially, the rationale behind this move is to enable security forces to monitor individuals with mental disorders who have undergone compulsory treatment. The same justification extends to tracking those struggling with alcoholism, drug addiction, and chronic mental health conditions. However, in practice, granting Russian security forces unfettered access to medical records presents another means of public surveillance, aligning with the broader trend of the government’s increasingly radical tactics.
- Appointment of a new head of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Irina Podnosova, a Russian lawyer and deputy to the former chief justice of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, Vyacheslav Lebedev, and a former classmate of Putin, has been appointed as the new chief justice. She was the only person who nominated herself and was approved by the Federation Council. In this way, the Russian dictator continues to control the judicial system through a person loyal to him. In addition, the system built by Lebedev during his 30 years in office, based on the de facto unification of the security forces and the judiciary, will continue to function.
- Russia has managed to restore some of its damaged oil refineries at a faster pace than anticipated. Reuters has revealed that Russia has made significant strides in restoring refinery capacities that suffered damage from multiple series of attacks by Ukrainian drones earlier in 2024. The report indicates that the Russians have managed to reduce the decline in refining output from 14% to 10%. Specifically, the refineries in focus include Rosneft’s Ryazan refinery, Kuibyshev refinery, and Syzran refinery. The swift repair progress comes as a surprise, as initial expectations suggested a lengthier timeline for restoration. Reuters notes that Russia achieved these repairs without relying on Western technology, demonstrating its ability to rapidly address the damage. However, the situation is not without its complications. The United States has openly protested against Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries, fearing that such actions will contribute to higher global fuel prices. This adds another layer of complexity to the ongoing geopolitical tensions surrounding the region.
- Unification of the New People Party and the Growth Party – reasons and consequences. News has surfaced regarding the merger of two “liberal” Russian political parties: the controlled New People party, currently in the State Duma, and the lesser-known Growth Party, led by Boris Titov, the Russian President’s Commissioner for the Protection of Entrepreneurs’ Rights. Interestingly, Titov was notably absent from the event announcing the merger, a move that could be interpreted as a form of protest or disagreement. The relationship between these two parties began to take shape in the summer of 2023 when they announced their intention to form a political alliance. Subsequently, they jointly nominated Vladislav Davankov as their presidential candidate. This move, seen as a Kremlin strategy, aimed to retain some control over a portion of the liberal electorate while offering them the option to vote for a “liberal” candidate. The current merger of these parties appears to be a natural progression and formalization of this political strategy. Consequently, there are now few other parties in Russia with a democratic-liberal orientation that operate independently of direct Kremlin control.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Russia is taking further steps aimed at destabilising Moldova. Russia’s increasing activity in destabilising Moldova is becoming more apparent. Just last week, a congress of “opposition parties” was held in Moscow under the patronage of a Moldovan pro-Russian politician, Ilan Shor, the leader of the banned Shor party and an oligarch wanted internationally for embezzling funds equivalent to 12% of Moldova’s GDP. Representatives from five parties – “Shor”, “Revival”, “Chance”, “Victoria”, and “Alternative and Forces for the Salvation of Moldova” – participated in this congress and announced the formation of the electoral bloc “Victorie”. They declared their united opposition to Moldova’s EU ambitions and their intention to fight for the country’s integration with Russia, the CIS, and the Eurasian Economic Union. Ilan Shor himself officially announced these plans, emphasising their commitment to implementing them in the upcoming presidential elections in the autumn of 2024. It is also noteworthy that Evgenia Gutsul, the current head of Gagauzia, an autonomous region within Moldova, attended this congress.
- The puzzling aspect of this move is Russia’s clear indication that this “political unit” is entirely under Kremlin control, with its organiser being a Russian agent barred from entry to Moldova. Additionally, all the political forces involved in the congress are relatively minor and unfamiliar to the Moldovan electorate. Moreover, Ilan Shor himself has been selected as the leader of the Victorie Union, suggesting this movement has little chance of success in the upcoming elections. Therefore, the main purpose of this political theatre appears to be to provide Russia with “legitimacy” for potential future destabilisation efforts in Moldova. This is further emphasised by the presence of Evgenia Gutsul, who has also assumed the role of executive secretary of the bloc’s political council. She has recently made several radical pronouncements, such as advocating for “withdrawal from Moldova in case of its unification with Romania” and expressing an intention to seek “help” from Russia, hinting at the possibility of a Russian military intervention. Furthermore, there have been frequent insinuations of conflict with Chisinau and reports of a meeting between Hucul and Putin last month. It seems that the Kremlin’s primary strategy is to destabilise Moldova ahead of the elections and the referendum on EU accession. The most probable scenario involves organising mass protests in Gagauzia, which Moscow could potentially exploit to initiate military operations in the region. Another indication of this strategy is the appointment of Marina Tauber, an associate of Ilan Shor, as secretary of the executive committee of the Victorie bloc. Tauber played a significant role in organising the mass anti-government protests in Moldova in March 2023.
- Russia withdraws its “peacekeeping” forces from the territory of Karabakh. Russia has initiated the withdrawal of its “peacekeeping forces” from the territory of Karabakh, which reverted to Azerbaijani control following the hostilities in September 2023. Russian troops have been stationed there since 2020 to oversee the so-called Lachin corridor and ensure the protection of local residents. With Azerbaijan regaining full control of Karabakh and the significant resettlement of the local Armenian population, there is no longer a justification for Russian troops to remain in the region. Consequently, the only remaining element of Russia’s military presence in the South Caucasus is the 102nd military base in Gyumri, the necessity of which is also under discussion in Armenia. This development indicates that the Kremlin’s influence in the region is gradually diminishing.
- Russia is relocating the Nornickel company’s facilities to China. The Russian company Nornickel is making plans to relocate some of its industrial facilities to China, with the intention of opening a copper processing plant there. This announcement came from the company’s chairman, Vladimir Potanin, a well-known Russian oligarch. He justified this decision by pointing out that it would help the company evade the impact of sanctions and make it more difficult to identify Russian products being sold under the guise of Chinese ones. The move comes in response to recent restrictions imposed by the United States and the United Kingdom on imports of Russian aluminium, nickel, and copper. While Norilsk Nickel itself hasn’t faced sanctions, they have affected it. Furthermore, Western sanctions have hindered the company’s efforts to modernize and replace equipment that relies on foreign technologies. The new plant in China is expected to be operational by 2027. This strategy might be adopted by other Russian companies in the future, potentially complicating efforts to exert sanctions pressure on the Russian regime.
