Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Key points on Putin’s federal address, Nikolai Patrushev’s tour of Latin America, and concerns over French President Macron’s initiatives.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- Putin’s federal address demonstrates the Kremlin’s evolving election strategy. On February 29, Putin delivered his annual address to the federal assembly, an event the Kremlin typically uses to outline its vision for Russia’s functioning and its domestic and foreign policies in the near future. This year’s speech coincided not only with the pre-election period but also with Putin’s need to publicly show that the Russian people support the war against Ukraine and his anti-Western, authoritarian agenda. In recent months, Putin has pursued a policy centred on militarism, sovereignty, anti-Western rhetoric, and “family values,” embodying what some might term a “candidate of war” strategy. This approach has been evident in all of Putin’s recent speeches and statements, often overshadowing or downplaying social issues. The most recent federal address suggests that the Kremlin may have recognized the shortcomings of its previous strategy.
- Putin dedicated only a small portion of his address to the issues surrounding Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the geopolitical landscape. However, his rhetoric mirrored that of his previous public speeches on the Russian-Ukrainian war. Once again, he laid blame on the West for “fomenting the conflict in Ukraine,” reiterating that “Russia did not initiate this war” and shifting responsibility for current events onto the United States and its allies. The failure of this months-long strategy, coupled with the observation that former “opposition” candidate Boris Nadezhdin began garnering relatively significant support with “peaceful” and liberal rhetoric in a short timeframe, compelled the Kremlin to alter its approach. There were constant announcements of increased financial aid in response. The announced amounts run into hundreds of billions of rubles, with some projects even reaching up to a trillion rubles. The natural question arises: where does the Kremlin plan to obtain the funds for these “gifts”? The current state of the Russian budget presents a challenge, as the government simply lacks the capacity to spend such amounts, especially given the ongoing war and the constant need for increased spending on it.
- Another social aspect highlighted in his speech was a strong emphasis on the need to increase the birth rate among Russians. In essence, Putin’s entire address could be summed up as “all efforts aimed at boosting the reproductive capacity of Russians.” Building on these proposals, Putin continued the social theme of his speech by announcing the introduction of various programs to cultivate new “talent” across various sectors of the Russian economy, allocating substantial funds for this purpose. Kremlin’s Sergei Kiriyenko, the official overseeing domestic policy in Russia, had previously begun work on this issue, making Putin’s announcements a reinforcement of existing efforts. In general, this address did not yield significant implications for Ukraine. Putin’s focus on the upcoming election compels him to pivot towards domestic rhetoric, particularly since the previous strategy did not yield the desired results.
- New anti-opposition legislation in Russia – The Kremlin destroys the remnants of uncontrolled media resources. The Russian State Duma recently approved a new law that bans individuals and companies from advertising on the information platforms of citizens labelled as “foreign agents.” This concept, introduced by authorities, aims to considerably hamper the work of opposition journalists, activists, and businessmen. Ukrainian Prism analyzed this action by Russian authorities last week and concluded that the law primarily targets the few remaining uncontrolled media figures and projects, notably journalist Alexei Pivovarov and his media outlet, “Redaction.” Since the law’s adoption, we have seen further evidence supporting this theory.
- It has been revealed that Pivovarov announced the dismissal of a considerable number of his team members, along with transferring the legal rights of his Telegram channel to the editors. Essentially, this move signals the potential shutdown of the entire project, which boasts a multi-million audience and stands as one of the last projects physically operating within Russia. Unlike other prominent “foreign agents,” this decision will likely have a more significant impact on “Redaction.” Another aspect, not widely reported, is the ban on advertising by the “foreign agents” themselves in Russian media.
- This decision holds potentially far-reaching significance as it affects the long-term prospects of journalists and activists listed as “foreign agents,” particularly those who are not widely known at present. The wording of the law is rather ambiguous, stating the prohibition of financing the “political activities of foreign agents,” which could also be interpreted as everyday public activities. This effectively bars Russian media from sharing information about the statements, actions, and regular news concerning “foreign agents.” Consequently, the Kremlin gains an additional tool to suppress any potential opposition figures within the public sphere.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Western media extensively report on preparations for Navalny’s exchange just before his assassination. It has come to light that the persistent rumors circulating for several months regarding the potential exchange of Navalny for the German detainee, Vadim Krasikov, may indeed be true. Last week, Maria Pevchikh, chairwoman of the board of directors of the International Anti-Corruption Foundation, Navalny’s political organization, stated that preparations for the exchange were underway. Following the death of the Russian opposition “leader,” Ukrainian Prism conducted an in-depth analysis of this political development, shedding light on the potential link between Navalny’s assassination and the US rejection of the Kremlin’s proposal to “freeze” the conflict. According to Reuters, negotiations involving the United States, Russia, and Germany did occur, and an agreement on a possible exchange was reached on February 15-16, the same day Navalny passed away. Media reports also suggest that Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich played a role in these talks, acting as a mediator to reach Putin. If these reports are accurate, it appears that the Kremlin aimed to openly demonstrate its “response” to the US’s refusal to engage in “negotiations” and its readiness to escalate further by targeting Navalny.
- Patrushev’s visit to Latin America. Last week, Nikolai Patrushev, the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation and one of the most influential figures among the Russian siloviki with close ties to Putin, visited several Latin American countries. These included Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. What’s interesting is that his tour coincided with both Navalny’s death and Putin’s federal address. The fact that the visits were not postponed or cancelled following Navalny’s death suggests that this event did not catch the authorities off guard.
- Patrushev’s absence during the federal address is quite notable, although delving into the reasons for this isn’t pertinent at the moment. His visit to Havana, Cuba’s capital, was officially announced as part of discussions on security matters. A Russian press release stated that Patrushev met with Cuban Interior Minister Lazaro Alvarez Casas, focusing on cooperation between their nations in intelligence, financial intelligence, and the judiciary. Additionally, the Security Council Secretary held discussions with former Cuban President Raul Castro and current President Miguel Diaz-Canel.
- In Venezuela, Patrushev engaged in talks with Secretary General of the National Defense Council, Jose Adelino Ornelas Ferreira, discussing various security issues. In Bolivia, the Security Council Secretary met with the President’s National Security Advisor, Jose Hugo Moldis. Lastly, in Nicaragua, Patrushev held discussions with President Daniel Ortega.
- It is likely that the Russian authorities are working towards potential security agreements or arrangements in the Latin American region to exert pressure on the United States. Given Russia’s primary political focus on the situation in Ukraine, we should consider the possibility of the Kremlin preparing for future negotiations with US authorities, using any potential agreements with Latin American countries as leverage. This concept aligns with the idea of “escalation for de-escalation.”
- Furthermore, this interest aligns with Putin’s strategy of promoting the concept of a “multipolar world,” demonstrating Russia’s continued role in international politics, particularly in regions where support for Western policies is weak or non-existent.
- Macron’s proposals to send troops to Ukraine: Kremlin’s reaction. French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent efforts to initiate discussions among Western allies regarding the possibility of deploying troops to Ukraine have sparked a vigorous debate not only in Europe and America but also in Russia. It appears that the Russian authorities have taken this possibility quite seriously. In the past week, we have witnessed reactions at various levels. Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, made a pointed statement, asserting that such a prospect would inevitably lead to “conflict” with NATO.
- Although the Russian president did not directly address Macron’s initiative during his federal address, he did mention the threat of strikes against Western countries and hinted at the potential use of nuclear weapons. These are arguments that we often hear from the Kremlin when facing significant challenges, both on the front lines and on an international level, particularly concerning the supply of weapons to Ukraine. This suggests that the Russian authorities are indeed concerned about this prospect.
- We can anticipate a new wave of statements and threats if Macron’s upcoming meeting with political party leaders on March 7, where the possible deployment of French troops in Ukraine will be discussed, yields positive results for Ukraine.
- Russian publication of “intercepted” conversations of German high-ranking officials. Russian propagandist and RT editor-in-chief Margarita Simonyan recently published an alleged recording of a conversation among German officials discussing the issue of supplying Ukraine with Taurus missiles and their potential use. In this “conversation,” they even discussed the possibility of striking the Crimean bridge with this weapon. Germany has reacted significantly to this development. Firstly, the German Ministry of Defense confirmed the interception of the conversation while also announcing plans to verify whether the Russian side made any alterations to it. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz described this move as an example of Russia’s information warfare. It is likely that the Russian authorities are attempting to thwart the potential supply of Taurus missiles through public outcry, especially considering that most members of the German political elite and government, with the exception of Olaf Scholz, support this step. It should be noted that this situation will likely delay the potential supply of these weapons to Ukraine.
