Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: Navalny’s death, Russian nuclear weapons in space, and the US refusal to discuss Russian proposals to “freeze the war”.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- On February 16, the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service announced the death of prominent Russian politician Alexei Navalny. Navalny had earned a reputation as the country’s foremost opposition leader, gaining recognition as an “anti-corruption crusader” over the years. Particularly in Europe and the United States, he was seen as a significant adversary to Putin. He established an extensive opposition network centred around the Anti-Corruption Foundation, an organization that boasted dozens of offices and hundreds of activists at its peak. The assassination of the Russian politician can be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, it could be viewed as a response to the US’s refusal to engage in negotiations on Ukraine and to halt the ongoing war, as reported by Reuters. Another factor could be the potential actions of radical elements within Russian high politics, who, with Putin’s tacit approval, may seek to exploit the murder as a pretext to reject any prospective negotiations and maintain the status quo of the conflict. Secondly, it could signify a significant political cleansing in Russia ahead of the upcoming presidential elections, which are crucial for Putin. With Navalny’s demise, Putin has effectively neutralized a long-standing threat to the Russian political establishment. Navalny’s death has elicited a broad response from the international community and Ukraine’s allies, including the United States. However, it seems unlikely that a robust response to this case will materialize. For Ukraine, the implications of Navalny’s death are also complex. On one hand, Navalny represented a long-term prospect. There was a significant chance that he could have been released from prison following Putin’s death. In such a scenario, Navalny’s emphasis on democratic principles could have potentially worked in Ukraine’s favour, introducing a degree of instability and partly thwarting the resurgence of anti-Western political extremism in the future Russian regime. On the other hand, Navalny’s stance on Ukraine was no different from that of many Russian politicians, as he maintained a defiant posture toward Ukraine’s sovereignty. His political movement, the Anti-Corruption Foundation, faces a similar fate. It is safe to assume that the Anti-Corruption Foundation has no real future. The question now is how it will proceed: will it disband, will its key members join other projects, or will it attempt a rebranding effort?
- Putin has recently approved a law known as the “fake news” law, allowing for property confiscation as a penalty for disseminating “false information about the Russian military.” This form of punishment is unprecedented within the Russian legal framework. The Ukrainian Prism previously highlighted that this legislation aims to exert additional pressure on civil society in Russia. It’s crucial to recognise that the definition of “fake news about the military” is quite broad. It’s anticipated that Russian authorities will leverage this new law to target remaining opposition activists. Notably, the law specifically cites its application to cases involving “desertion,” suggesting a preemptive move by Russian authorities to deter potential defections within the military.
- The Russian Supreme Court has rejected the lawsuit brought forth by former presidential candidate Boris Nadezhdin, who was disqualified from the election by the Central Election Commission. It’s uncertain what the “opposition” politician had hoped to achieve. It was evident from the outset, as soon as Nadezhdin incorporated an anti-war stance into his rhetoric and garnered significant electoral support in Russia, that the Kremlin would not permit his candidacy. Despite this, he persists in attempting to pursue legal avenues for his inclusion in the presidential race, filing a fresh lawsuit with the Supreme Court. However, such endeavours are unlikely to yield any favourable outcomes.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Last week, the American media revealed that the U.S. government had acquired intelligence suggesting that the Russian Federation was advancing its capability to deploy nuclear weapons in space with the aim of targeting satellites. While Russian authorities refrained from outright refutation, they instead diverted attention to “tricks employed by the U.S. to sway Congress towards providing aid to Ukraine.” It’s evident that the Kremlin is actively exploring military technologies as leverage against the United States. China’s response to this information remains uncertain since the use of nuclear weapons in space could result in the destruction of not only American satellites but also potentially those belonging to China.
- We are witnessing a series of statements from Armenian authorities indicating Armenia’s gradual distancing from Russia. Ukrainian Prism examined Prime Minister Pashinyan’s recent remarks, where he stated that Armenia is not an ally of Russia in the conflict with Ukraine. This marked the first overt public criticism of the Kremlin by Armenian officials. During the Munich Security Conference last week, Pashinyan reiterated this stance and emphasised the friendly relations between the Ukrainian and Armenian people. Such consistent messaging leaves no doubt that the previous statements from the Armenian leadership were deliberate and calculated.
- We continue to observe a notable increase in the effectiveness of Western sanctions, particularly those imposed by the United States, against Russia. According to Bloomberg, the Russian oil sector has encountered significant challenges since the start of 2024, with tankers increasingly refusing to transport their oil. Additionally, the banking sector remains under pressure. Last week, Russia’s state-affiliated Vedomosti media outlet revealed that banks in the UAE are refusing payments from Russia and are closing Russian clients’ accounts. Similar restrictions were reported earlier with regard to Turkish and Chinese banks. These developments highlight the growing financial strain on the Russian economy. It is anticipated that foreign banks will continue to impose more blockades and restrictions on Russian clients in the foreseeable future.
- Last week, Reuters reported that the United States had rejected the Kremlin’s overtures aimed to signal the so-called “willingness to freeze the war.” The Russian authorities have consistently hinted at their readiness to negotiate an end to the conflict, often through Western media channels, without formally committing to ceasefire agreements or making concessions. This stance has been apparent since the autumn of 2023. Notably, there have been diplomatic exchanges with intermediary states, particularly those in the Persian Gulf, through which Putin has conveyed signals to the United States regarding his inclination to “freeze” hostilities along the front line. Ukrainian Prism has been conducting a thorough analysis of this aspect of the Kremlin’s foreign policy manoeuvres. The Russian authorities aim to exploit the potential of a “frozen” conflict for two primary objectives. Firstly, they seek to boost Putin’s standing ahead of the presidential elections by projecting an image of victory. Secondly, they intend to secure a period of relative peace to bolster military capabilities and prepare for future engagements from a position of strength.
- The Russian authorities successfully exerted pressure on Ecuador regarding potential military equipment supplies to Ukraine. Last month saw a diplomatic tug-of-war unfold. Ecuador had intended to send $200 million worth of Soviet and Russian-made weaponry to the United States in exchange for modern arms. Upon learning of this deal, Russia retaliated by imposing a ban on Ecuadorian banana imports, a significant sector of the country’s economy. However, after negotiations with Russian officials, Ecuador declared that it would not transfer any weapons to Ukraine, as announced by Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Gabriela Sommerfeld. Subsequently, Russian authorities lifted the restrictions on Ecuadorian bananas. This incident demonstrated that Russia still has the capacity to pressure certain countries on the issue of arms supplies to Ukraine.
