Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week/Tyzhden publishes an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: The culmination of Nadezhdin’s registration saga, Putin’s interview with Tucker Carlson, and China’s economic “back-stabbing”.
Domestic policy takeaways:
- The epic saga of selecting presidential candidates for the upcoming elections in Russia has finally concluded. As highlighted by Ukrainian Prism, the Russian authorities have taken steps to create bureaucratic obstacles for the “anti-military” candidate Boris Nadezhdin. The Russian Central Election Commission claimed that the number of mistakes in his nomination signatures exceeded 5%, which prevented Nadezhdin from running in the election. As a result, there will be 4 candidates to choose from: Vladimir Putin, Vladislav Davankov (New People – Growth Party), Leonid Slutsky (Liberal Democratic Party), and Nikolai Kharitonov (Communist Party of Russia). These three candidates do not present any real media problems for the current Russian dictator since they are either politically weak or controlled politicians. Since the beginning of the election campaign, Ukrainian Prism has noted that each of the four system-endorsed parties will nominate a candidate whose rhetoric on the key issue of war will not be able to counter Putin’s narratives. Consequently, it’s evident that candidates representing the Communist Party and the Liberal Democratic Party are not actively engaged in an election campaign, nor do they dare to critique the sitting president. Davankov’s case is somewhat different. As a member of a fully authorities-controlled “liberal” party which does not oppose the Kremlin’s foreign policy, he may uncontrollably cause discomfort for Putin’s domestic political bloc. As Nadezhdin has united a large part of the Russian opposition electorate around him in the process of his own nomination, the potential support of Davankov in the elections could provoke a conflict. In recent months, various sources have indicated that the Kremlin aims for Putin to secure 80% of the votes, with no other candidate exceeding 10%. Should a substantial portion of the opposition electorate rally behind the “liberal” Davankov, it would pose a challenge, signalling that a significant segment of the populace still holds liberal views—an area of concern for the Kremlin’s public policy. There are also reports suggesting that Davankov has initiated discussions on a potential “cooperation” arrangement with Nadezhdin. However, it remains uncertain whether this proposed move has received the Kremlin’s approval. Most likely, any independent initiative from a “liberal” candidate would be met with efforts to neutralise it.
- Russian government-controlled media outlet Kommersant reported that Putin may give a presidential address to the Federal Assembly before the election. The Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly is an annual political event where the Russian president provides his own vision of the future direction of the country, defining the main domestic, economic and foreign policy narratives.
- Such a scenario appears highly plausible, given that this event has consistently occurred in the first few months of each year in recent times. It’s safe to assume that this year’s address will carry greater significance. Putin will primarily leverage it as a key element of his election campaign. In previous years, the addresses have predominantly centred on socio-economic issues, fostering the impression that the Russian president prioritises the well-being of the Russian people. This year, Putin’s election strategy must be taken into account. Ukrainian Prism has analysed Putin’s recent actions and statements and concluded that the Kremlin’s strategy will focus on ‘war’, ‘militaristic’ and ‘conservative’ narratives. The last element has been dominating lately. So, at first glance, it is reasonable to anticipate that the upcoming “address” will be centred around these three narratives. However, it should be understood that today, the Russian authorities have set themselves the goal of emphasising the topic of potential “negotiations” and “ceasefire”. This was openly highlighted during Putin’s recent interview with American journalist Tucker Carlson. Ukrainian Prism has noted that the Kremlin would potentially like to use the idea of a “ceasefire” as a means to provide Russia with time to prepare its army for the next stage of the conflict. Thus, during the “address,” we can expect Putin to reiterate this message. He can potentially strengthen this position. There is also a possibility he will publicly declare the limits of his “concessions.” The issue has similarly begun to circulate in the information space. Last month, Bloomberg reported that Putin, through intermediaries, informed the United States that Russia is prepared to discuss “Ukraine’s security issues” and may reconsider its insistence on Ukraine’s neutrality and opposition to its potential accession to NATO. This rhetoric would signify a significant shift in the Kremlin’s stance, given that its entire public strategy has been centred around opposing Ukraine’s membership in the Alliance. Carlson mentioned that Putin, in an off-the-record conversation, indicated his readiness to make “compromises” regarding negotiation matters. These facts suggest that during the “address,” Putin will address three main issues: the socio-economic aspect (such as increasing various payments ahead of the elections), the “politically conservative” aspect, and the foreign policy aspect (promoting the concept of “negotiations” and publicly defining “concessions”).
- Russia has recently encountered a series of economic challenges. In addition to the sanctions against the Russian economy, which have increasingly affected the country in recent months due to the United States tightening its oversight of restriction enforcement, the Kremlin must contend with its own internal issues. For instance, reports indicate that following the recent attacks by Ukrainian drones on the Novatek and Rosneft refineries, the level of oil refining decreased by 135,000 barrels compared to December 2023. However, it’s important to note that this data is somewhat outdated, as there have been additional attacks on other Russian refineries since then. Furthermore, scheduled maintenance activities at these facilities, typically commencing in March, should also be considered. Collectively, these factors are expected to adversely affect the Russian refining market and production levels.
- Since the start of January, there have been successful attacks on five different Russian refineries.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Russian President Putin’s interview with American journalist Tucker Carlson could have been a major win for Kremlin propaganda and significantly influenced American perceptions of Ukraine, given Carlson’s large audience. Instead, the interview yielded no benefits to the Russian authorities. Carlson expected to hear from Putin an open statement of his support for conservative ideas. Instead, the Russian leader embarked on an unexpected tangent during the interview. He launched into a historical “lecture” outlining Russia’s rationale for its actions against Ukraine, dedicating a significant 25 minutes of the conversation to his interpretation of the history between Russia and Ukraine. With each point, he aimed to discredit not just the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state but also the very existence of the Ukrainian nation itself. In another segment of the interview, Putin expressed feeling “offended” by the West, lamenting its refusal to acknowledge him as an equal while maintaining his authoritarian leadership. He reiterated his familiar stance on the perceived aggression of NATO and accused Western leaders of betraying Russia by reneging on promises to refrain from expanding the Alliance eastward. Consequently, Putin’s remarks not only failed to garner interest but also sparked disagreement with his communication tactics. Even Russian propaganda outlets have acknowledged that focusing on conservatism and opposition to left-wing ideas would be more advantageous than delving into history and criticising the West. Nonetheless, Putin raised a significant point that merits attention. Specifically, the Russian leader openly reiterated his “readiness for negotiations.” This declaration stands out as the only noteworthy outcome of the interview.
- Armenia is gradually moving away from Russia, a trend closely monitored by the Ukrainian Prism in recent months. Initially, Armenian authorities displayed caution, their statements and actions only hinting at a gradual shift away from longstanding close political, economic, and military ties with Russia. Until February 2024, there hadn’t been any overt public confrontation. However, in the past two weeks, there has been a noticeable shift in rhetoric. The Armenian Prime Minister explicitly stated that his country does not consider itself an ally of Russia in the conflict with Ukraine. This indicates a newfound openness from Armenian authorities towards supporting the Ukrainian position. In the fall of 2023, Secretary of the Armenian Security Council Armen Grigoryan took part in a summit on the Ukrainian “peace formula.” On the bilateral level, Armenia openly announced for the first time that it could no longer rely on Russia in terms of security. Similar rhetoric had been present before but in the format of allusions and statements about security cooperation with other states, especially France. It was later stated, however, that “Armenia is not turning its back on Russia; it is merely diversifying its relations with international partners.” This remark is only a formality, as the Armenian prime minister also hinted at the issue of withdrawal from the CSTO.
- “There are ongoing discussions in Armenia regarding the development of a long-term strategy centred around alliances that serve the country’s enduring interests,” stated Pashinyan.
- Another notable development occurred when Prime Minister Pashinyan responded to a question regarding the potential arrest of Putin should he visit Armenia, given the country’s recent accession to the International Criminal Court. Pashinyan refrained from a direct response, stating that such a decision falls outside his jurisdiction. The Kremlin reacted unfavourably to this statement. This instance further underscores Armenia’s ongoing distancing from Russia.
- We continue to observe the effectiveness of US sanctions on Russia. In recent weeks, Russian authorities have encountered significant challenges, particularly in the banking sector. Previously supportive nations are now beginning to refuse business dealings with Russian companies, exacerbating the situation. Last week, this trend extended to China. Reports emerged that Chouzhou Commercial Bank, a major institution for Russian imports in China, notified its customers of an end to operations with Russia. This information surfaced through Russian sources, specifically the pro-government Vedomosti media outlet. The restriction reportedly extends beyond this bank to others as well. The day after this news broke, Putin and Xi Jinping engaged in discussions. While the official statement highlighted “close cooperation” and the need to counter foreign interference jointly, it is plausible that the issue of financial constraints was among the topics discussed.
