Every Tuesday, The Ukrainian Week will publish an overview of the political, social and economic situation in Russia and Belarus in partnership with the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. The Council’s Russian and Belarusian Studies Programme presents a new weekly #aggressoranalysis, in which Iaroslav Chornogor and Anton Oksentiuk analyse the latest news in Russian domestic and foreign policy.
This week’s highlights: the LGBT ban, Shoigu’s drive to take over control of Wagner’s property, and the spread of Russian narratives about a “ceasefire.”
Domestic policy takeaways:
- The key highlight of Russia’s domestic political scene was the “World Russian People’s Council”, a political congress held under the patronage of the Russian Orthodox Church. This event was actively promoted through the media resources of the so-called Russian ‘Orthodox oligarch’, Konstantin Malofeev, who is also the deputy head of this organisation. Similarly, this event was promoted by Alexander Dugin, a well-known Russian publicist and ideologue of neo-Eurasianism and rashism, who also publicly emphasised the “historical” events following the congress. The main focus was placed on Putin’s visit, who was supposed to deliver an “important speech.” As a result, the Russian president was only present online, and he made several rather controversial statements regarding social policies. His speech focused on typical Kremlin narratives and populist ideas. These included statements about “family values,” “protection of Russia,” ” sovereignty,” and “preserving the unity of the people.” In a rather unfortunate part of the speech, Putin expressed the need to “revive the tradition of having 7-8 children in each family.” The follow-up analysis showed a rather negative reaction to this proposal on Russian social media platforms.
- It is very likely that such a PR stunt, carried out by Malofeev and Dugin, was only aimed at increasing the congress audience and broadening the media coverage. No new narratives from the Russian authorities have been identified.
- The date of the large annual press conference, in combination with the so-called “direct line” held by the Russian president, has been officially announced. This event will be held on December 14. Ukrainian Prism has previously analysed the significance of this event. It is highly likely that Putin will use this public event to announce his participation in the 2024 presidential elections.
- Last week, it became known that the Russian Supreme Court decided to designate the “international LGBT public movement” an extremist organization and ban it in Russia. Such actions indicate the Russian authorities’ desire to increase conservative rhetoric in social policy. This decision will also provide the Kremlin with ample opportunities for additional pressure on representatives of the non-systemic “opposition” and those who pose a threat to the control of Russian public space.
This decision became just another example of the Russian authorities’ determination to continue similar rhetoric. For example, in recent years, there has been a significant increase in public discussion regarding an official ban on abortion. It is likely that this topic will become another factor in future decisions. It should not be ruled out that these bans will eventually become a part of Putin’s election narrative.
- Some Russian officials have started to promote the idea of a possible “ceasefire”. For example, last week, Vladimir Medinsky asserted that Russia has never pursued the goal of occupying Ukraine. The Russian media have also been consistently sharing similar narratives. The Ukrainian Prism analysed this matter and warned about the Russian authorities’ potential desire to create the opportunity to take a pause in the conflict, which they could later use to regroup and strengthen their forces and prepare for continued aggression. Thus, Russian authorities have been gradually introducing this narrative into the public discourse for several weeks now.
- The first potential “opponents” of Putin in the upcoming presidential elections in 2024 have been revealed. Alexei Nechayev, the leader of the system’s “liberal” New People Party, will likely be his party’s candidate. In addition, the head of the Communist Party, Gennadiy Zyuganov, has also announced his candidacy. This way, we can see that the Kremlin has decided to allow the “opponents”, who are not posing any publicity and media threat to Putin’s ratings, to run. It is likely that this time, the Kremlin’s domestic political bloc decided not to repeat the situation of 2018 when the CPRF nominated the rather popular Pavel Grudinin to create an illusion of a political struggle.
Foreign policy takeaways:
- Last week, the Russian delegation from the Ministry of Defense held negotiations with the leaders of Mali and Niger. Russia was represented by Deputy Defense Minister Yevkurov, who met with Assimy Goyita, the self-proclaimed president of Mali and the leader of the National Committee for the Rescue of People military junta, which seized power in 2020. It is quite clear that such steps are a result of Shoigu’s desire to take control of the Wagner PMC military capabilities left after Prigozhin’s death. While such a prospect does exist, it should be noted that the effectiveness of a similar structure, due to the specifics of the Russian Defence Ministry apparatus, will likely plummet.
- For a short period of time, the Kremlin has faced a series of international failures. For example, for the first time in its history, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) did not elect Russia to its executive body, the Executive Council. Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania were nominated as members of the council from the Eastern European region. In addition, after the voting, Russia was not included in the new membership of the Council of the International Maritime Organization for 2024-2025.
