ANTIheroes 2010

Investigation
30 December 2010, 12:51
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine 
For its creative jurisprudence
 
Yuriy Baulin, Vasyl Brynets, Serhiy Vdovichenko, Serhiy Vynokurov, Anatoliy Holovin, Mykhailo Gultai, Mykhailo Zaporozhets, Volodymyr Kampo, Mykhailo Kolos, Dmytro Lylak, Maria Markush, Viacheslav Ovcharenko, Oleh Serheychuk, Petro Stetsiuk, Andriy Stryzhak, Natalia Shaptala
 
The Constitution and Ukrainian law say that the main role of the Constitutional Court is simply to interpret laws and the Constitution. But as of Sept. 29, 2010, the Constitutional Court has clearly taken on a new role that, given the new system of government, seems more important: to confirm or cancel whatever someone wants to see confirmed or cancelled in other branches of government—without any concern for the consequences. That day, the Court cancelled the Constitution that had been in effect for nearly five years for “procedural violations” in the legislature. But the Court failed to explain just how this would affect all government decisions based on the now “illegal” Basic Law. The EU’s Venice Commission was extremely taken aback by Ukraine’s courtroom trick, by which the judiciary canceled the version of the Constitution that was in force.  
 
 
Viktor Yanukovych    
For driving a treadless bulldozer
 
Having taken in hand all conceivable and inconceivable powers, Mr. Yanukovych’s main achievements 
nevertheless have amounted to persecuting his opponents and giving his blessing to the sharing out of choice bits of the country’s assets to family, friends and northern neighbors. The suspicion grows every day that Viktor Yanukovych will one day guess why the political machine he built isn’t going anywhere, but it’s impossible to warn him about this: the Yanukovych bulldozer has a totally soundproof cabin…
 
Viktor Yushchenko      
For being a one-of-a-kind pensioner 
 
Having lost his bid for re-election with a pitiful 5% of the vote, the ex-President has not only set himself up better than any of his fellow losers, but better even than many a winner. In contrast to the former, investigators are not especially interested in him or those near to him. In contrast to the latter, Mr. Yushchenko no longer has to concern himself with state affairs but can simply communicate with “his people” whenever he feels like it and only on topics of interest to him. Add the nice country home he built himself and it’s not such a bad deal, really, considering his failed administration and miserable showing.
 
The Political Punters
For being unable to distinguish the possible from the impossible 
 
Not all, but too many theorists (Andriy Yermolayev, Vitaliy Kulyk, Mykhailo Pohrebinskiy, and others) loftily predicted that, if he won the Presidency, Viktor Yanukovych would, most likely, magically, turn out to be a “new,” “more civilized,” and even “European” leader, compared to what we saw in 2003-2004 and 2006-2007. Needless to say, Mr. Yanukovych has not changed—to no one’s great surprise, given that he still sincerely believes that he won fair and square in 2004. It seems that these political pundits—with the exception of those who were simply earning their daily dollar—simply forgot that politics is the “art of the possible.” That is, some things are impossible, no matter what.
 
Petro Symonenko      
For being a swinging comprador 
 
Ever since Ukraine’s Communist leader dumped his first wife for a much younger journalist amid considerable scandal, wicked tongues have accused him of an “immorality” unseemly for the leader of the proletariat. But even communists have the right to a private life, and why shouldn’t they have sumptuous properties that would normally be more appropriate to one of the bosses of an “anti-people regime.” Needless to say, Mr. Symonenko does, indeed, have such a property, about which information began to surface on the internet last spring. By November, one of the top national channels did a big story on it. Many observers saw this as the Yanukovych Administration’s way of suggesting that the CPU, a supposed ally of the tycoonish Party of the Regions, needs to toe the line a bit more. How Mr. Symonenko took this is not known, but statements that the CPU doesn’t see eye-to-eye with the current Administration have become fewer and fewer, while the head of the Crimean CPU Committee, the outspoken Leonid Grach who has bitterly opposed the unnatural union of Red ideas and greenbacks, has apparently had his Party card rescinded.
 
Mykola Azarov     
For being so ’umble 
 
Ukraine’s Premier so far hasn’t proved himself the ideal leader of a Government, but he has shown himself the ideal leader of a Yanukovych Government. Despite enormous experience working in high office, Mr. Azarov has not accumulated any political capital. On the contrary, he has been the focus of all the ire of his political bosses, from Kuchma to Yanukovych. Despite constant talk of supposed reforms, he is unlikely to go down in history as Ukraine’s Balcerowicz. It looks like Mr. Azarov considers his ratings about as important as his contribution to future generations. All that matters is to keep the boss(es) happy.
 
Dmytro Tabachnyk   
For having a bulletproof conscience 
 
Challenged for trying to create a divide in Ukrainian society using the most blatantly crude remarks (e.g., “unwashed Halychians”) the then-still nominee for the post of Minister of Education and Science promised journalists that, once he was minister, he would stop making headline-burning remarks “regarding my personal positions,” and would speak only as a civil servant. Needless to say, the infamous historian never did stop making outrageous remarks. Nor did his bosses see any disconnect between his position and the government’s: as of December, Mr. Tabachnyk has expanded his portfolio, thanks to the latest shuffle by Mr. Yanukovych, and is now also responsible for youth and sports. There are only two possible explanations: either the anti-Ukrainian position of Mr. Tabachnyk is shared by the top officials in the current Administration, or the Ministry has some serious people covering his back—people whom even the current “strongman” President doesn’t want to cross.
 
David Zhvania    
For being endlessly pragmatic 
 
The VR Deputy, who was openly said to be financing Narodna Samooborona under ex-Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko, was one of the first to cross the aisle after the Presidential election and join the Yanukovych Administration’s newly-formed majority in the Verkhovna Rada. Soon, such deputies were nicknamed tushky or carcasses after a line from an old soviet joke about the parrot that was desperate to leave the USSR, “I don’t care if I’m a carcass or stuffed.” So David Zhvania became one of the first tushky, later to be legitimized by the Constitutional Court, in direct contradiction to its own previous ruling that VR deputies can only form a majority on the basis of factions, not individual deputies.
 
Oles Dovhiy    
For dispelling the myth of the new generation
 
Ever since their country gained independence, Ukrainians have firmly believed that a younger generation would eventually appear among business and political leaders, people who had been raised in a free country and would be able to build a completely new and bright life. A typical representative of the “young team” of the Marionette of Kyiv, Leonid Chernovetskiy, the 30-year-old secretary of Kyiv City Council has been dispelling this myth in his own curious way. The enormous private wealth written up in the press and hundreds of scandalous Council decisions selling off city land, that Mr. Dovhiy signed off on, brilliantly illustrate just what kind of new life the “young team” 
is building—and for whom.
 
Volodymyr Lytvyn  
For not knowing the difference between a runner and a gunner
 
Last year, only the hopelessly lazy failed to laugh at the Speaker’s little performance: when he announced his decision to run for President, he wiped his eyes tearfully with his “mother’s runner.” Today, the Verkhovna Rada is being run from a very different place, but, in public, Mr. Lytvyn puts on a show of manly decisiveness. Last year, when the tribune was being blockaded by the then-opposition Party of the Regions, all he did was vainly urge them to disperse. After the recent beating-up of now-opposition BYT deputies by now-ruling PR deputies, he gave what for—to those who had been beaten. “Because they were blocking the tribune”.
 
Anatoliy Mohyliov      
For trying to clean out the country
 
The country’s top policeman is of the belief that, in order to ensure the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed human rights and freedoms, all rallies and demonstrations need to be prohibited, especially by the opposition: “No protest action can violate the normal life of other people. If I come into your bedroom with a drum and begin pounding because birds are landing on my balcony, is that normal? So the police will take measures to protect the rights of all people.” When asked how it is that the new NBU governor has no ID number, Mr. Mohyliov just shrugged: “It’s irrelevant“.
 
Ghennadiy Kernes       
For being so unpopular 
 
Mr. Kernes apparently won the mayoral race in Kharkiv, in the end—although exit polls gave the vote to his rival from Batkivshchyna, an opposition party, Arsen Avakov. In fact, a big contingent of Kharkiv voters did not recognize Ghennadiy Kernes and set up a Maidan against ballot-rigging in the city election. The inauguration of the newly-elected Mayor took place to the tune of “Ballad of the Gun Moll”1 and a funeral march. Thus demonstrators in Kharkiv welcomed “their” mayor.
 
1“Murka” is a soviet prison song about a woman gangster whom even the men feared. But when they started being picked up one by one, they knew someone had squealed. When they realized it was Murka, they killed her.
 
Hanna Herman     
For being lost in translation
 
Among Ms. Herman’s many public statements explaining her boss’s linguistic lapses and the far-from-democratic actions of the new Administration, her June press release stands out. In it, she addresses the use of force by the police. As the Deputy Chief-of-Staff put it, the police simply misunderstood the meaning of the word “order:” “Order is not when the police pressure the opposition; order is when the police pressure criminals. Order is not when the police kill people in custody; order is when you aren’t afraid to go out on the street. Order is when so many people don’t die on the country’s roads.” In the fall, when the international community expressed dissatisfaction with the way the local election campaign was being run, Ms. Herman was happy to apprise them of the unique nature of Ukrainian democracy: “The definition of democracy is not something fixed in stone…
 
Democracy has its own features in every country, including Ukraine.” Therefore, she said, the President would continue to “establish prospects that the rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens will be extended.”
 
Serhiy Tihipko  
For being in the wrong place at the wrong time—again
 
Having won a sensational 13%+ in his run for the Presidency, Mr. Tihipko converted his fortune into a post that, alas, did not convert into a political future for him. The luckless Mr. Tihipko had the honor of explaining the real and imaginary benefits of the scandalous Tax Code, which had been drawn up by completely different influences in the Cabinet. His explanations were such an evident hit that, with his new portfolio, he gets to explain all the unpopular changes to the pension system and social benefits, too. Looks like the promising Vice Premier has been well and truly buried, long before the next VR and Presidential races.
 
Vadym Kolesnichenko       
For demonstrating patriotism
 
This one of PR’s talking heads happily spits a “preventive dollop” on everything that could possibly be tied to developing Ukrainian culture, language and identity, arguing that this shows his dedication to the idea of a “brotherhood of nations.” For example, Mr. Kolesnichenko condemned the lyrics of a song by Ivan Franko, “Ne pora,”2 which VR opposition deputies sang on the 20th anniversary of Ukraine’s Declaration of Independence, as “incitement to ethnic hatred.” In that case, how should we evaluate Mr. Kolesnichenko’s involvement in organizing a controversial exhibit called “Volyn Massacres”3 or his attempts to promote fascism at the Haidamaky.ua festival of patriotic songs?4 Exactly what is patriotism for Mr. Kolesnichenko himself and the movement he leads, “Russkoyzsychnaya Ukraina”5? The 300 St. George’s ribbons that he distributed on May 9 in the Verkhovna Rada, he called “a symbol of the unity of these countries” in honor of the memory of the “great victory of the soviet people.” Are we to understand that Mr. Kolesnichenko is hankering after a non-existent country—or that he is the promoter of a single Russian state? Fortunately, for now, the words and deeds of this particular PR man are only encouraging a new wave of real Ukrainian patriots. So, keep it up, you Russian-speaking komsomolets!
 
Walid Harfouche       
For not being shy about censorship and lulling the masses 
 
“I believe that the First National television channel should automatically be pro-government…It should always report on the work of the government and present only positive information for viewers,” Mr. Har­­fouche told one interviewer. The ease with which the Vice President of the National Television Company capitulated took many by surprise. The Stop Censorship NGO named the channel a “recordbreaker” for the number of violations of professional standards and noted that Mr. Harfouche’s professional qualifications in television media were questionable at best, given that, prior to being appointed VP of NTCU, the Lebanese businessman was primarily known for organizing beauty contests and publishing a gossip rag called Paparazzi. His efforts have so far led to the content on the First National moving more in the direction of show-business and low-grade entertainment.
 
Ostap Stupka      
For being so dedicated to his career
 
Stupka Junior played the role of a UPA commander in an anti-Ukrainian quasi-historical Russian film called “We from the Future-2“, which portrayed OUN-UPA soldiers as bandits and murderers of peaceful Ukrainian civilians. Why he, a Ukrainian, agreed to fight on the side of Russia in the information war, Ostap Stupka explained thus: “Hey, I need to work, you know. I’m an actor. I have to work. These ideological issues, who did what to whom…”
 
Vladyslav Kaskiv     
For also being so flexible
 
Founder of the Pora Party and one of the youthful leaders of the Orange Revolution, Vladyslav Kaskiv was appointed by President Yanukovych to be responsible for national investment projects in August. Looks like Mr. Kaskiv learned to be adept at adapting to difficult life situations to his own advantage in his youth. In 1993, at 20, he was the Vice President of the Central Union of Ukrainian Students; in 2000, he was an independent advisor to the Minister of Economy under President Kuchma; in 2005, thanks to the Revolution, he finally found his niche in Big Politics.
 
Kostiantyn Hryshchenko      
For being multi-vectored 
 
The way that Ukraine’s Foreign Minister is trying so hard to be friends with both Russia and the West, could be seen, among others, in the way that Ukraine “participated” in the Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony. Initially, following the example of Russia, Ukraine decided not to delegate its Ambassador to Norway. Mr. Hryshchenko explained that this was not a political move, but that the Ambassador was due in Kyiv at that time for a coordination meeting of heads of diplomatic missions. Then, suddenly, after EU officials reacted negatively to Ukraine’s snub of the Nobel, the Ministry had a re-think: the Oslo Embassy’s First Secretary went to the ceremony in the end.
 
Viktor Pshonka        
For showing legal ingenuity  
 
Godfather to the President’s son, Viktor Pshonka rolled up his sleeves and began tackling the nation’s total corruption the minute he was appointed Prosecutor General. By a curious coincidence, his black list of corrupted officials against whom criminal charges have been laid largely contained the names of opposition leaders. Moreover, the Prosecutor’s Office is showing considerable ingenuity in the process: after opposition deputies were beaten up in the VR, cases were opened (possibly against these same deputies) for “disrupting the work of a national deputy;” ex-Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko was held for one reason and left under guard for another; etcetera. Mr. Pshonka himself offered the press this eloquent phrase: “The main thing is that we’ve laid charges and opened criminal investigations.” Perhaps this really is an end in itself for the current Prosecutor.
 
Valeriy Khoroshkovskiy       
For having his hand in Moscow’s pockets 
 
Appointed acting head of the SBU, Ukraine’s security service, by President Yushchenko, under President Yanukovych the Rada approved Mr. Khoroshkovskiy as full-fledged security tsar. Yet the man has never worked even for a second in any security capacity. During 2010, Mr. Khoroshkovskiy distinguished himself by arresting documents on KGB activities under the USSR—he even had the historian with these documents taken in for questioning [see UW Digest #9]—and for scandals over television frequencies that were taken from Channel 5 and TBi and given to the Inter channel, which is part of his media empire. Whatever the case may be, the head of the country’s security agency is actively working to prevent voters from getting objective information about their history and about current events. This benefits Ukraine’s northern neighbor, which is winning the information war even without his efforts. The Kremlin’s hand in Mr. Khoroshkovskiy’s actions is even obvious to supporters of the party in power. “The only one I see as 100% pro-Russian and forever dedicated to them is Khoroshkovskiy,” says former Deputy Taras Chornovil. “This is the one person who is likely to be getting orders from Moscow.”

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